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Abstract 
 
Title:  A Road to Success Under Construction? Examining the Constraints 
of Public-Private Partnerships in Sweden 
 
Authors:  Thomas Hallström, Hugo Martinsson and Jonathan Roxeheim 
 
Tutors:  Carl-Henric Nilsson, Dept. of Business Administration, School of 
Economics, Lund University; Ulf Jensen, Dept. of Real Estate 
Management, Faculty of Engineering, Lund University  
 
Issue:  Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) have been embraced across the 
globe the past decades, with the driving forces varying across 
countries. Considering the relatively scarce usage of PPP in Sweden 
it appears highly relevant to identify the constraints for realising PPP 
projects. The outcome of such a study provides better understanding 
on what factors could constrain countries with low utilisation, as well 
as what could drive PPP usage in countries with high utilisation.   
 
Purpose:  The purpose of this thesis is to identify the constraints of realising 
public-private partnerships in Sweden and suggest measures to 
overcome them.  
 
Method:  By assessing Sweden’s PPP readiness in the Economist Intelligence 
Unit’s (EIU) Infrascope index, low-scoring PPP readiness areas are 
identified. By combining the low-scoring areas and critical success 
factors for PPPs, three major areas were identified as the major 
constraints. 
 
Conclusions:  This thesis has identified three major constraints of realising PPP 
projects in Sweden; insufficient evaluation, inadequate organisational support 
and knowledge and political resistance. The first refers to the lacking 
capacity of evaluating public and private alternatives. The second 
refers to the insufficient coordination of support and capturing and 
sharing of PPP knowledge. The third refers to the lack of political 
will to conduct PPP projects and the underlying arguments. 
Measures involve the establishment of a formalised and systematic 
evaluation tool for the first constraint. A domestic and international 
PPP knowledge infrastructure is recommended for the second 
constraint. Finally, nuancing the debate, an investigation of 
alternative financing forms and the establishment of a clear decision-
making tool for is suggested for the third constraint. 
 
Keywords:  Offentlig-privat samverkan, OPS, public procurement, public-private 
partnerships, PPP, risk allocation theory, decision-making, life cycle 
  
A Road to Success Under Construction? 
 
5 
Acronyms 
 
AP3   Tredje AP-fonden (Third Swedish National Pension Fund) 
BKK   Byggandets Kontraktskommité (Construction Contracts Committee) 
C   Centerpartiet (The Centre Party) 
CSF  Critical Success Factor 
EIU Economist Intelligence Unit 
ESV  Ekonomistyrningsverket (Swedish National Financial Management 
Authority) 
FM   Facilities Management 
FP  Folkpartiet Liberalerna (The Liberals) 
KD  Kristdemokraterna (The Christ Democrats) 
KKV  Konkurrensverket (The Swedish Competition Authority) 
LOU  Lagen om offentlig upphandling; SFS 2007:1091 (The Public Procurement 
Act) 
LUF  Lagen om upphandling inom områdena vatten, energi, transporter och 
posttjänster; SFS 2007:1092 (The Act concerning Public Procurement 
within the areas of water, energy, transport and postal services) 
M  Moderaterna (The Moderate Party) 
MP  Miljöpartiet (The Green Party) 
NKS  Nya Karolinska Solna  
PFI  Private Finance Initiative 
PPP  Public-Private Partnerships 
PSC  Public Sector Comparator 
S  Socialdemokraterna (The Social Democrats) 
SPV  Special Purpose Vehicle 
TV  Trafikverket (The Swedish Transportation Administration) 
V  Vänsterpartiet (The Left Party) 
VFM  Value For Money 
VTI  Statens väg- och transportforskningsinstitut (The Swedish National Road 
and Transport Research Institute) 
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Concept definitions 
 
Concessionary agreement - A contract where an operator takes all the risk for 
providing a service and charges the end-user for doing so. 
 
Critical Success Factor - Those few key areas of activity in which favourable results are 
absolutely necessary for a manager to reach his/her goals. 
 
Value For Money – Outperforming or achieving the requested value to the lowest 
possible cost. 
 
Infrastructure - The essential facilities and systems supporting a country, city, or area. 
For example: transportation, schools and hospitals. 
 
Traditional procurement - The most frequently used forms of publicly funded 
procurement. 
 
Public Sector Comparator - The accumulated price, for which a project could be 
realised by traditional procurement, which is compared to the accumulated price for a 
PPP alternative. 
 
Public-private partnerships - A consortium of private companies, undertaking the 
projection, construction, maintenance, financing and ownership of a facility during a 
predetermined period on behalf of a public client. 
 
Special Purpose Vehicle - A company with the sole purpose of the financing, 
projection, construction and maintenance of a facility in a Public-Private Partnership 
project. The SPV is typically owned by a consortium of companies and has the 
contractual agreement with the public client.   
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1 Introduction 
This chapter covers the background of the problem area, a brief history of the development of PPPs and 
explains the purpose of the thesis. 
 
1.1 Background 
Infrastructure is by most considered to be a cornerstone in societal development. The 
positive relationship between public infrastructure investments and economic growth is 
today widely acknowledged by both academics and practitioners (Égert, Kozluk, & 
Sutherland, 2009; The World Bank, 2014). In most countries, the public sector is 
responsible for realising infrastructure projects – a task included in public procurement.  
 
Meanwhile, the population of earth is forecasted to increase heavily. United Nations 
projects the world’s population to reach 9 billion by 2050 and subsequently highlights 
the evident need for infrastructure supporting this growth in population (Standard & 
Poor's, 2014a). Even today, needed infrastructure spending heavily exceed actual 
spending (Figure 1) with recent discussions emerging as to whether tax funds sufficiently 
will support social welfare in the future (Lundberg, 2013). Some even go as far as 
estimating the global gap between investments needed and available public funds to 
increase to 500 billion USD annually in 2030 (Standard & Poor's, 2014a). 
 
Considering the strong growth of the world population, the importance of a country’s 
infrastructure policy and the growing investment gap, the question of the most effective 
resource utilisation in public procurement arises.  
 
 
Figure 1: 2011 Infrastructure need versus actual spending (The World Bank Group of Twenty, 2011) 
In recent years, a discussion regarding the effectiveness of public procurement and a lack 
of innovation in the construction industry has emerged (Bröchner, 2012; Nilsson, 2009). 
It is argued that traditional publicly funded procurement forms, where a public entity 
pays private contractors to carry out a predetermined and specific project, too often 
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involve exceeding cost and delays. Such procurement simply does not deliver the value 
for money (VFM) that potentially could be achieved. Meanwhile, in the past decade, 
many states have struggled with massive budget issues, partly because of inadequate 
public finance control, resulting in difficulties to realise desired infrastructure 
investments (Nilsson, 2009). 
 
These three factors - effectiveness, innovation and finance - are the main drivers for 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPP). PPP is an umbrella term for alternative forms of 
realising and/or financing projects aiming to construct all kinds of infrastructure. Just as 
the name implies, PPP means collaboration between the tax-funded public sector and 
the profit-driven private sector. The goal of PPPs is to handle public investments from a 
life cycle point of view in an efficient way by high qualitative standards. This is done by 
contracting a private entity to undertake the projection, construction, maintenance and, 
perhaps most important, financing and ownership of a facility during a predetermined 
period. The phenomenon of PPP dates back to the 1990s in the United Kingdom, 
introduced under the device Private Finance Initiative (PFI) (L. Andersson & Sirén, 
2009). Since 1990, the European PPP market has increased from 2 realised projects 
worth 1.387 billion EUR to 118 realised projects worth 15.750 billion EUR in 2009 
(Kappeler & Nemoz, 2010). PPP is furthermore used to various extent across countries, 
as exemplified by the European PPP activity in 2013 displayed in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2: Total PPP Value by Country (European PPP Expertise Centre, 2013) 
Since its introduction, controversy has emerged whether PPPs offer superior VFM 
compared to traditional procurement. The lack of finished PPP projects and difficulties 
in evaluating an outcome to a counterfactual alternative has resulted in ambiguous 
opinions as to the effectiveness of PPPs (Grimsey & Lewis, 2005). PPP promoters 
emphasise efficiency, financial control and innovation while the opponents often 
mention increased cost of capital, excess private profits and contractual complexity (Cruz 
& Marques, 2013). Furthermore, the arguments are often driven by political ideology 
rather than objective analysis, something that infects the debate (De Bettignies & Ross, 
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2004). However, profound research implies that under the right circumstances and in the 
right type of project, PPP brings benefits compared to traditional procurement (L. 
Andersson & Sirén, 2009; Cruz & Marques, 2013; Kwak, Chih, & Ibbs, 2009; Lundberg, 
2013).  
 
1.2 The problem 
As previously described, the usage of PPP in public procurement distinctively varies 
between countries. As such, it appears highly relevant to study the reasons why some 
countries use PPP to a larger extent than others (Olander & Widén, 2011). Sweden is of 
particular interest in this respect considering the similarities in economic conditions 
compared to countries with high usage of PPP. However, PPPs in Sweden are less 
frequent on a state and regional level compared to many other countries. Only one major 
infrastructure project, Arlandabanan, has been realised using PPP and a second project, 
Nya Karolinska Solna (NKS), is being completed while this thesis is being written.  
 
Several reports and investigations have been released on the topic of PPP with authors 
including Banverket, Vägverket, Ekonomistyrningsverket (ESV), Konkurrensverket 
(KKV), advisory firms and independent researchers. These emphasise several effects and 
elements of the PPP structure that could benefit Sweden. However, they fail to provide 
sufficient, concrete and research based conclusions as to what constrains Sweden from 
realising PPP projects. Furthermore, the majority of the material is somewhat obsolete.  
 
Meanwhile, the Swedish PPP debate is close to non-existing, stemming mainly from an 
unequivocal negative standpoint from the Minister of Finance Anders Borg and 
Finansdepartementet (FD) (Borg, 2014; FD, 2014), referring mainly to the higher cost of 
capital associated with PPP projects and the ambivalent value for money research. 
 
Considering the relatively scarce usage of PPP in Sweden it appears highly relevant to 
identify the constraints for realising PPP projects. The outcome of such a study provides 
better understanding on what factors could constrain countries with low utilisation, as 
well as what could drive PPP usage in countries with high utilisation.  
 
1.3 Purpose 
The purpose of this thesis is to identify the constraints of realising public-private 
partnerships in Sweden and suggest measures to overcome the same.  
 
1.4 Delimitations 
In this thesis, traditional procurement is referred to as the most frequently used form of 
procurement, namely construction contracts. Furthermore, PPP is referred to as the 
general concept. The authors are well aware that distinctions and specific varieties exist 
but do not consider these. Moreover, technical public accounting principles are not 
covered in-depth because of irrelevance and the authors’ limited knowledge in this area. 
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2 Methodology 
In this chapter the methodology of the thesis is presented. The chapter is divided into subsections, each 
explaining the methodology from a theoretical perspective followed by the practical implications of using 
the methodology.  
 
Research can come in many different shapes and forms, each dependent on the outcome 
one wishes to obtain. To fully understand the chosen methodology in this thesis, the 
subsections of this chapter is structured in the order of the actual research process, as 
described by Jacobsen, Sandin, and Hellström (2002) in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3: The research process, as translated and adopted from Jacobsen et al. (2002) 
2.1 Defining a purpose 
According to (Kumar, 1999), two crucial determinants to be aware of when choosing a 
research problem are the interest in the subject and the manageability of the study in the 
frame of constraints. The curiosity of PPP originally stemmed from one of the author’s 
earlier coursework. Well aware of the extensive research of the subject, the challenge was 
to find a gap that could be filled and concretised within the given time frame. Thereby, a 
literature review was conducted. 
 
2.1.1 Literature Review 
A literature review serves three purposes: it brings clarity to a research problem, it 
improves the methodology and it broadens knowledge within the research area. 
Specifically, the literature review assists in putting a research problem in the context of 
the existing body of knowledge thereby acquainting the researcher with methods and 
procedures previously used by others. Moreover, it covers the problems that others have 
encountered and exposes gaps in established research (Kumar, 1999). 
 
The literature review was initially performed with a very broad perspective, gradually 
zooming into a more specific area of study. The intent was to cover a historical 
perspective, major research areas, main issues and recent trends of PPP. Consequently, 
the plentitude of research performed on more mature markets internationally gave 
reason to look further into research of PPP within a Swedish context. Besides this 
geographical scope, another aspect of interest was also the actuality of performed 
research. With these prerequisites, it was concluded that there is a gap in research of why 
PPP occurs seldom within a Swedish context, what constrains Sweden from realising 
Defining a purpose Choosing approach Choosing form of  data Choosing method to collect data 
Selecting respondents Choosing method to analyse data Verifying conclusions Interpreting results 
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PPPs and how these constraints could be overcome. Previous research either has a 
different focus or is obsolete enough to expose this gap. 
  
2.2 Choosing approach 
The approach should be chosen on the basis of the purpose in order to be effective. 
(Kumar, 1999) suggests that a research approach can take the form of descriptive, 
correlational, explanatory, exploratory or a combination of the first three. An important 
distinction is the notion of time, where a descriptive approach usually dictates a certain 
point in time while a correlational or explanatory approach use time series of data to 
describe causal relationships (Jacobsen et al., 2002). In this respect, the chosen approach 
in this thesis is mainly descriptive. 
 
Furthermore, a study can be intensive or extensive in nature, each a function of width 
and depth. The intensive approach uses few variables but goes more into depth while the 
contrary is true for an extensive approach (Jacobsen et al., 2002). In this study, an 
intensive approach has been used, as it focuses on the Swedish context in 2014 and uses 
in depth interviews with a relatively small number of respondents. The purpose of using 
an intensive approach was to get a thorough and nuanced overview of the situation, as 
described by Jacobsen et al. (2002). The practical implications of this approach concern 
above all the generalisability of the study, which is covered in section 3.7.2.  
 
2.3 Choosing form of data 
Data can either be of quantitative or qualitative form. The data type chosen is a function 
of how the purpose is phrased and what answer the researcher is looking to find 
(Jacobsen et al., 2002). This study is based almost exclusively on the qualitative approach. 
(Taylor & Bogdan, 1984) refers to the qualitative methodology as “research that produces 
descriptive data: people’s own written or spoken words and observable behaviour”. Naturally, a 
qualitative methodology is highly inductive in the sense that the research question is 
vaguely worded initially, where after the researcher looks for patterns and understanding 
in the collected data (Taylor & Bogdan, 1984). Meanwhile, the results are often less 
generalisable and thereby less applicable to other contexts (Jacobsen et al., 2002).  
 
In this study, a qualitative approach was seen as most appropriate to fulfil the purpose. 
As it aims to identify constraints in Sweden from a process, procedure and knowledge 
perspective, a quantitative approach was deemed less suitable to fulfil the purpose. 
Instead, a qualitative approach allows the study to fully examine the relevant dimensions 
of Swedish public procurement.  
 
2.4 Choosing method to collect data 
2.4.1 Primary Data 
The primary data collected in this study was mainly done so by individual telephone 
interviews. The individual interview is well suited when one is interested in how different 
individuals view a specific issue or phenomenon (Jacobsen et al., 2002; Kumar, 1999), 
such as PPP in a Swedish context. Due to budget as well as time constraints, the majority 
of all interviews were conducted over telephone or the VOIP-service Skype. Although 
interviewing in person captures body language and other important aspects, the 
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telephone interview decreases the chance of the interviewer effect, where a respondent’s 
answers are affected by the interviewer’s physical presence (Jacobsen et al., 2002). 
Furthermore, the interviews followed a semi-structured format with open-ended 
questions. The semi-structured format ensured that interviews followed a set of pre-
determined questions while being flexible enough to dig deeper into certain questions 
and answers. The pre-determined questions were all sent to the interview subject with 24 
hours notice in order to increase efficiency and allow for preparations. Each set of 
questions were customised in accordance with the relation the respondent had with PPP. 
For example, the questions for a financial stakeholder had a financial emphasis. While 
the semi-structured format decreased the comparability of the answers, it gave further 
insight in the opinions, attitudes and knowledge of each individual. The interview guide, 
including stakeholder customisation, is presented in Appendix A. 
 
The majority of all interviews were conducted by two of the authors, where one led the 
interview and the other transcribed in real-time. Since transcribing in real-time increases 
the chance of missing parts of the answer, each transcription was sent to the respondent 
after the interview was done. The respondent then had the chance to correct, add or 
withdraw statements. Three respondents exercised this right with minor corrections. 
Each interview lasted one hour on average. 
 
2.4.2 Secondary Data 
Secondary data was primarily collected through the database of Google Scholar and 
LUBSearch. The purpose of collecting data this way was to increase understanding of 
PPP in general from an academic as well as a practitioner perspective and the problems 
that other countries have encountered in particular. Furthermore, publications, reports 
and articles from Swedish sources were also collected in order to get an overview of the 
Swedish PPP context. While Jacobsen et al. (2002) and Kumar (1999) both argue that 
there may be validation problems with secondary data in the forms of bias or differing 
aims of the studies, the ambition was to triangulate sources when possible. 
 
2.5 Selecting respondents 
2.5.1 External selection 
Selecting respondents for the individual interviews was a task performed in conjunction 
with a stakeholder analysis. A stakeholder can roughly be defined as a person, group or 
organisation that is affected by, or has the power to affect a decision (Freeman, 1984). In 
turn, a stakeholder analysis can be defined as a process of defining aspects of a social 
phenomenon where after parties influenced by the phenomenon is identified and 
categorised (Reed et al., 2009). For this study, the first step was to draw a stakeholder 
map. The objective of drawing a stakeholder map was to identify all key stakeholder 
groups. Consequently, all possible stakeholders for PPP in Sweden was listed and 
thereafter grouped by creating five categorised groups. These stakeholder groups were: 
Advisors, Clients, Financiers, Governmental Organisations, Politicians and Suppliers. 
The resulting stakeholder map is displayed in Figure 4. 
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Due to time constraints, a selection of stakeholders to interview had to be made. There 
are many matrices, diagrams and models on how to prioritise stakeholders but the most 
fitting matrix for this purpose was found to be The Problem-Frame Stakeholder Map as 
adopted by Bryson (2004).  
 
  
Figure 4: Stakeholder map of PPP in Sweden 
Figure 5: The Problem-Frame Stakeholder Map, as adopted by Bryson (2004) 
A Road to Success Under Construction? 
 
16 
Each stakeholder was mapped into Figure 5 where stakeholders in the rightmost column 
were of special interest. The reasoning behind this is that regardless of the attitude, the 
influential power of that very stakeholder is what ultimately pushes the usage of PPP in 
any direction. Determining stakeholder power is indeed a very subjective task. However, 
the aim was to cover as many interviews as possible from the powerful end of the 
spectrum towards the middle, thereby covering a majority of the most important 
stakeholders. As a point of reference, Finansminister Anders Borg serves as an example 
of a very powerful stakeholder. 
 
2.5.2 Internal selection 
Within the context of each group or organisation, an internal selection also had to be 
made. The method of ensuring that the best possible source within each organisation 
was selected varied from case to case. Best possible source was however defined as a 
first-hand source that had the competence and knowledge to represent the organisation 
and that could accurately depict the rest of the organisation. One method that was found 
to be useful for getting in contact with these type of sources was a variant of the 
snowball method. The snowball method means that the researcher asks the interview 
subject for advice in who to contact regarding the same subject (Jacobsen et al., 2002). 
Furthermore, in the early stages of the study the tutors supplied contact information to 
several gatekeepers within different organisations. A gatekeeper is a person within an 
organisation that provides access to information and mediates contacts (Taylor & 
Bogdan, 1984).  
 
Table 1 illustrates the respondents that were identified within each category and 
organisation: 
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INTERVIEWS  
  Respondent Organisation 
Henceforth 
referred to as: 
Politicians 
  Anders Borg Finansminister Borg, 2014 
  Peter Andersson Finansdepartementet FD, 2014 
Clients 
  Mats Abrahamsson Stockholms Läns Landsting SLL, 2014 
Financiers 
 Debt f inanc ing  
  Tore Emanuelsson Nordic Investment Bank NIB, 2014 
  Andreas Jensen Skandia Skandia, 2014 
 Commerc ia l  Banks  
  Karin Lagerstrand Handelsbanken SHB, 2014 
 Equity  
  Nick Crowther Innisfree IF, 2014 
Suppliers 
 SPV  
  Ulf Norehn Swedish Hospital Partners SHP, 2014 
 Construc t ion  
  Alexander Kielland Skanska Skanska, 2014a 
  Karl Reichelt Skanska Skanska, 2014b 
 Faci l i t i e s  Management  
  Fredrik Sandberg Coor Service Management Coor, 2014 
Governmental Organisations 
  Magnus Kristiansson Sveriges Kommuner och Landsting SKL, 2014 
  Jan-Olof Andersson Trafikverket TV, 2014 
  Jan-Erik Nilsson 
Statens väg- och 
transportforskningsinstitut VTI, 2014 
  Kristoffer Sällfors Konkurrensverket KKV, 2014 
Advisors & Opinion Makers 
 Consul tancy  
  Lars Tvede-Jensen PwC, Advisory PwC, 2014 
 Opinion Makers  
  Jan-Erik Nilsson Author & Researcher Nilsson, 2014 
Table 1: Interviews 
2.6 Choosing method to analyse data 
Jacobsen et al. (2002) describes the analytical process sequentially starting with describing 
the data, systematising and categorising the data and finally combining and interpreting 
the data. Essentially, the aim is to reduce the collected data making it more manageable.  
 
The analytical process of this thesis emanates from an established framework for 
assessing a country’s PPP readiness that was discovered in the literature review. The 
framework - The Infrascope Index, fully described in Appendix B, is used by The 
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Economist Intelligence Unit and assesses country capacity to carry out sustainable 
infrastructure PPPs. It involves the scoring of six categories, divided into 19 indicators, 
of the quality of certain fundamental dimensions that facilitate the usage of PPP in a 
country (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2012). In order to fully meet the purpose of this 
thesis, the outcome of the framework was supplemented with further elaboration and 
explanations with an emphasis on the categories in which Sweden scored poorly. 
  
2.6.1 Describing the data 
The description of the data was two-fold. The first process was to transcribe all 
interviews. As previously mentioned, the interviews were transcribed in real-time to the 
best of ability. Immediately following each interview, the authors together filled the gaps 
and consequently sent the transcription to the respondent for review and agreement. 
This type of internal and external validation ensured that no important data went 
missing.  
 
Later on in the research process, when the reviewed interviews had been returned, the 
transcriptions were annotated in a spreadsheet. Annotating an interview is an important 
process that aims to reduce raw data to usable data for analysis (Jacobsen et al., 2002). 
With all interviews annotated in the spreadsheet, the data was ready to be categorised. 
 
2.6.2 Categorising data 
According to Jacobsen et al. (2002), categorising data refers to the process of grouping 
data together to simplify and make the data comparable. From the basis of the 
spreadsheet, the data was grouped into the 19 indicators as provided by the Infrascope 
Index. Categories should in general be derived from the data than the other way around 
(Jacobsen et al., 2002). However, since the categories and indicators of the Infrascope 
Index is already established and peer reviewed, it was seen as irrelevant to modify or 
create new categories for the specific index. Instead, the need for a more nuanced and 
explanatory section was identified and subsequently added. The supplementary data in 
this section, 4.7 Additional findings, was deemed required in order to fully understand the 
Swedish context. In this respect, it can be questioned whether the index fully 
encompasses the PPP readiness of a country, or if supplementary indicators could be 
needed.  
2.6.3 Combining and interpreting data 
With fully described and categorised indicators, the actual scoring was initiated. The 
indicator data from the individual respondents was first combined and interpreted to 
form a basis for scoring. Thereby, the data that was found to be explanatory or irrelevant 
for scoring, was separated into section 4.7. The rule of thumb to score an indicator was 
that the more respondents supporting an argument, the stronger the basis for scoring. 
However, the outliers were consistently considered of importance and thereby 
documented as well. 
 
By triangulating the respondents’ answers against each other, especially statements of 
events, the scoring was given further legitimacy. Finally, secondary data was used to 
supplement primary data when applicable.  
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2.7 Validity 
Internal validity addresses the question whether the required data was acquired or not. 
External validity on the other hand address whether the results are applicable on other 
contexts (Jacobsen et al., 2002). 
  
2.7.1 Internal validity 
According to Jacobsen et al. (2002) internal validity can be verified by consulting experts 
about the results or by critically reviewing the study oneself. In this study, the analysis 
and conclusions drawn have been independently discussed with tutors and different 
stakeholders in order to determine the feasibility. Moreover, the final draft was sent to a 
selected few for review. These measures can all be related to what is commonly known 
as face validity. Face validity means that experts acknowledge the conclusions that they 
are familiar with, however, the downside is that the perhaps more interesting unfamiliar 
conclusions are not validated (Jacobsen et al., 2002). Besides outside help, the analysis 
and drawn conclusions were also compared to studies performed in other contexts. The 
written material on PPP is extensive and there are several studies that accentuate 
interesting conclusions drawn from using other methodologies. For example, the 
indicators derived from the Infrascope index were compared to the critical success 
factors identified in theory in order to draw conclusions of problem areas. Such a 
comparison, also known as methodology triangulation, thereby improves internal validity 
(Jacobsen et al., 2002).  
 
The other method of questioning internal validity is by critically reviewing the central 
phases of the research process. Thereby, a discussion will follow regarding whether the 
data used accurately depicts reality and if the methodology for drawing conclusions can 
be considered valid.  
 
First and foremost, the amount and width of interviews is considered significant enough 
to provide an overview of the Swedish context at the very least. Nonetheless, it can be 
questioned whether the respondents are capable of reflecting the full picture of PPP in 
Sweden, since infrastructure procurement is highly complex and multi-organisational. 
There are some respondents which were not possible to get a hold of which could have 
provided insightful information for the purpose of the study. These are displayed in 
Table 2. Secondary data have been used to supplement the lack of contact with these 
respondents. 
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Respondent 
Position and 
Organisation Reason 
Information 
disregarded Action 
Catharina 
Elmsäter-Svärd 
Minister for 
Infrastructure 
 
Ministry of Enterprise 
and Energy 
Not interested  Opinion and 
attitude towards 
PPP 
Extended 
interview with 
The Ministry of 
Finance  
Hans Lindblad Director General of 
the Swedish National 
Debt Office 
 
Swedish National 
Debt Office 
Time constraints Opinion on debt 
finance of PPP 
Extended 
interview with 
Nordic 
Investment 
Bank 
Kerstin Hessius CEO 
 
AP3 - Third Swedish 
National Pension 
Fund   
No answer  The use of pension 
funding in PPP-
projects 
Extended 
interview with 
Skandia as well 
as secondary 
data from 
personal 
presentation  
Linda Andersson EY - Real Estate 
Strategy 
No answer Assessment of 
NKS 
Extended 
interview with 
PwC 
Representative European Public-
Private Partnership 
Excellence Center 
(EPEC) 
Time constraints An international 
perspective on 
PPP and their 
experience as an 
interest 
organisation  
Extended 
interview with 
Nick Crowther 
about 
international 
experiences  
Table 2: Desirable interviews that were not conducted 
Furthermore, the accountability of collected information can be questioned. Since a 
majority of the respondents were first-hand sources, i.e. sources that have been in 
contact with PPP themselves, it can be deducted that statements of events were true. 
However, since PPP can be linked to business or ideological motives, it may so be that 
the respondents shone a light that benefitted their own agenda. To the fullest extent, the 
aim was thereby to cross-examine responses between sources of different agendas and 
mutual independence. For example, if a public source suggested insufficient PPP 
knowledge among public clients, and it was verified by a private source, the statement 
was considered true even though the opinions of the relevance of such a comparison 
diverged. 
 
Finally, the theoretical foundation of the thesis can be critically reviewed. The Infrascope 
index used to categorise and score data may not be the most reliable framework 
available. For example, the indicator list was derived from a workshop conducted with 
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what is described as international sector experts as well as practitioners. However, these 
are not mentioned in specifics. Moreover, it is stated that the indicator list was revised 
after extensive peer review without mentioning by whom it was peer reviewed. Even so, 
the methodology and sources used to collect data is considered to be the same in this 
thesis as compared to how the framework is used on other countries. It can also be 
argued that the Infrascope Index is particularly targeting developing countries. However, 
since United Kingdom was plotted and given a score it is argued that Sweden could be 
so as well. A more in-depth description of the Infrascope methodology is given in 
Appendix B.  
 
2.7.2 External validity 
As mentioned previously, external validity covers the grade of generalisation, which can 
take two forms. The first form concerns whether the few observations can be 
generalisable to a theoretical level, perhaps applicable to a larger context. The other form 
concerns generalising the frequency of the findings to sufficiently being able to state that 
a similar frequency will be reached in a larger population. For qualitative studies it is 
primarily the prior form that can be generalised (Jacobsen et al., 2002). Since the 
identified stakeholders are solely organisations or groups, the data selection can be 
considered typical for a larger context if the respondents can be considered 
representative for their respective organisations. In most cases the respondent had a 
leading position within the organisation in regards to PPP and can thereby be considered 
as representative for their organisation. Furthermore, the questions asked were typically 
formulated in order to capture the views, attitudes and knowledge of the entire 
organisation. As such, the findings presented are extrapolated from an individual level, to 
an organisational level to a national level.  
 
Whether the conclusions and suggestions can be applicable to other national contexts is 
unclear as the collected data and purpose of the study are highly context-specific to PPP 
in Sweden. No such generalisability is thereby claimed. However, the constraints that are 
identified are all interconnected to the critical success factors as described by research. 
Thereby, the constraints can be seen as further verification of research previously 
conducted. Furthermore, the suggested measures to overcome the constraints may be of 
interest in contexts where similar problems are experienced.  
 
2.8 Interpreting the results 
In the final stage of the research process, the results are to be interpreted. According to 
Jacobsen et al. (2002), interpretation means placing the results in a larger context. There 
are essentially two ways to do this; by comparison or by utilising theory (Jacobsen et al., 
2002). First, the rendered score for Sweden was compared against other country’s results 
in order to place the result in a context. Thereby, the conclusion of Sweden’s relative 
PPP readiness could be more easily drawn. Furthermore, it simplified the process of 
determining and comparing isolated indicators.  
 
Second, the data was interpreted on the basis of established theory. In particular, the use 
of researched critical success factors for PPP were used in order to support conclusions 
of found constraints. Additionally, the measures suggested to overcome the constraints 
were supported and inspired by benchmarking other countries’ actions.  
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3 Public Procurement and Public-Private Partnerships 
This chapter explains the different procurement forms and how PPPs relate to these. Furthermore, a 
thorough explanation of PPP fundamentals is presented, including a definition, the SPV structure, 
driving forces, challenges and critical success factors. 
 
3.1 Traditional procurement and life cycle 
In procurement, a contract is defined as ”a commitment by a company to a client to 
perform a major assignment, especially regarding a building or another stationary facility, 
for example a bridge” (Bengtsson & Arvidsson, 2014). The traditional view of a contract 
usually has the construction of the project as the main focus of attention. However, the 
construction phase is only one part of the whole life cycle of a facility. The various 
phases over the lifetime are described as Planning, Projection, Construction, 
Maintenance 1, Maintenance 2 and Reinvestment (Nilsson, 2009). 
 
All these phases are associated with different costs and are mutually dependent. 
Logically, higher initial construction cost, with higher quality, results in lower operation 
and maintenance cost, and vice versa. Consequently, the need for a holistic perspective 
when building new facilities has for many years been a frequently discussed topic in the 
construction industry (Nilsson, 2009). The question thereby remains; how can the client 
best create incentives for the contractor to optimise the facility for decades to come? 
 
There are essentially three main types of contracts, which include several variations; 
construction contracts, design and build contracts and performance requirement 
contracts. 
 
3.1.1 Construction contract 
Normally, a construction contract begins with an internal process where problems are 
identified and the projection is done. This results in a technical specification, which is 
delivered to the contractors. A key element of a construction contract is that the client 
demands an “input” which means that the contractor will perform predefined 
operations. The technical specification contains precise information on how the work 
should be carried out and what work efforts are needed, both in terms of estimated 
numbers of hours for various operations and material needed (Nilsson, 2009). 
 
The bidding process is therefore based on offers of price per unit for various activities 
that the public client requests. Based on the incoming bids, the client will assign the 
contractor with the best offer to each single activity (Nilsson, 2009).  
 
A similar procurement and tendering process is repeated for each step through the 
facility’s lifetime. This procurement form is common and is regulated in Sweden by 
AB04, “General Conditions of Contract for Building and Civil Engineering Works and Building 
Services” from 2004, which is a framework developed by Byggandets Kontraktskommitté 
(BKK) (Nilsson, 2009). 
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3.1.2 Design and build contract 
The design and build contract is an evolved version of the construction contract, under 
which the client procure a contractor to do both the detailed projection and 
construction. The contractor will therefore have the opportunity to influence the design 
of the project from the start. This procurement form is also common and regulated in 
ABT06, “General Conditions of Contract for Design and Construct Contracts for Building, Civil 
Engineering and Building Services” (Nilsson, 2009).  
 
3.1.3 Performance requirements contract 
Performance requirements contract is a further development of the design and build 
contract with one addition; the agreement also includes a maintenance commitment 
during a contracted period of time after the construction of the facility has been 
completed. Performance requirements contract are, unlike more traditional procurement 
forms, not as common in Sweden and have not yet been regulated by BKK. As a result, 
there is no general framework developed for how this type of contract should be 
designed. As opposed to more traditional types of procurement, the performance 
requirements contract involves only one procurement process, covering the whole or big 
parts of the life cycle, depending on how comprehensive the specific commitment is 
(Nilsson, 2009). 
 
The key difference between performance requirements contracts and more traditional 
procurement types is that the client asks for an “output” instead of an “input”. The 
client does not require a certain approach or technical specification, but rather specifies a 
certain functionality of the facility. See Figure 6 for an illustration of the different 
procurement types (Nilsson, 2009). 
 
Figure 6: Illustration of the different procurement forms, as adopted by Arnek et al. (2007) 
3.2 Public-Private Partnerships  
3.2.1 Definition 
PPP is an umbrella term for alternative forms of realising or financing projects aiming to 
restore or construct all kinds of infrastructure. Just as the name implies, PPP is about 
collaboration between the tax funded public and the profit-driven private sector. The 
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goal of PPPs is to handle public investments from a life cycle point of view in an 
efficient way and by high qualitative standards. PPP shares one important element with 
performance requirements contracts - the requirements are specified in terms of 
functionality. However, PPP projects differ in two important areas - financing and 
ownership - which means that projects are privately funded and owned during a 
predetermined period as opposed to traditional procurement forms (L. Andersson & 
Sirén, 2009). 
 
3.2.2 The Special Purpose Vehicle 
In a PPP project, the public entity signs a contract with a private entity, usually in the 
form of a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), undertaking the financing, projection, 
construction and maintenance of a facility. This setup is called the Standard SPV 
Structure and is illustrated in Figure 7. The SPV is owned by a consortium of companies, 
usually a construction company, an investor and sometimes the public client, that 
commit to design and construct the facility. Furthermore, operation, service and 
maintenance contracts between the SPV and relevant firms are signed 
(Ekonomistyrningsverket, 2006). 
 
 
Figure 7: The Standard SPV-structure, as adopted by Ekonomistyrningsverket (2006) 
3.2.3 Financing the Special Purpose Vehicle 
3.2.3 .1  Equity  and debt  
To finance the construction of the undertaken contract, a mix of equity and debt is 
normally used. The financing of the SPV may vary over projects but is structured on 
certain basic principles. The SPV shareholders invest equity in the SPV and raise debt on 
the private capital market, usually from banks. 
 
With the increasing need of infrastructure financing as described previously, a recently 
emerged financial trend is the Europe 2020 Project Bond Initiative launched by the 
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European Investment Bank (EIB). The main goal of the initiative is to “create the conditions 
to attract additional private sector financing for individual infrastructure projects” (European 
Investment Bank, 2014). As such, the initiative aims to provide an alternative to bank 
loans, by creating attractive conditions to realise project bonds. One such improved 
condition is the provision of partial credit enhancement by a subordinated loan or credit 
line from EIB to the project. Thereby, the financing of the SPV is structured in tranches 
of seniority, where project bonds are issued as senior debt, the loan from EIB as 
subordinated debt, and finally the equity on the bottom level as displayed in Figure 8. 
 
In practice, this means that in the risk of default, the repayments will be prioritised in 
order of seniority. For example, the project bondholders will be repaid first. This credit 
enhancing measure will thereby improve the rating of the project bonds to an investment 
grade level, attracting primarily institutional investors like insurance companies and 
pension funds (Henderson, 2012). 
 
 
Figure 8: Project Bond Initiative, as adopted by European Commission (2014) 
3.2.3 .2  Forms o f  compensat ion  
The compensation to the SPV can be structured in several ways and is essentially the 
revenue of the contract. The most common forms of compensation are described below. 
Common for all these forms is that the compensation is, directly or indirectly, depending 
on certain quality requirements being met (Näringsdepartementet, 2000): 
 
• User fees: railroad or toll fees paid by the users of the facility. 
• Fixed amount: the public client guarantees a fixed payment during predetermined 
points in time.  
• Shadow tolls: can be used in transport infrastructure projects. The payment is 
based on measured flows of traffic, usually guaranteed by a minimum and a 
maximum amount.  
• Availability based compensation: the payment is based on how available the facility is 
to the users.  
• Goal based compensation: the payment is based on how well predetermined goals 
are met, often in terms of traffic security or environmental aspects. 
 
Furthermore, to illustrate the different cost streams of traditional procurement and 
PPPs, an illustration is provided in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9: Comparison of payment flows in procurement (Andersson, 2007) 
3.2.4 Driving forces 
Pressed financial situation, increasing need for efficiency, improved resource utilisation 
and increasing need for quality follow-up are a few reasons as to why new procurement 
models are needed. The main driving forces for PPP projects can be categorised into 
increased efficiency, financial incentive and increased innovation (L. Andersson & Sirén, 
2009).  
3.2.4 .1  Incr eased  e f f i c i en cy  
A driving force for using PPP in infrastructure projects is the increased efficiency in the 
construction phase and the operation over time as a result of the life cycle perspective. 
By aligning the interest with the private party, the public client receives support in 
evaluating the structure of the contract, risk allocation and monitoring the project over 
time (L. Andersson & Sirén, 2009). 
 
The fact that the private contractor is profit driven is a strong driving force as to the 
efficiency of PPP projects. It drives cost awareness, which drives more efficient and 
qualitative construction and operation. Furthermore, the model of continuous retroactive 
compensation contributes to PPP projects rarely being delayed (L. Andersson & Sirén, 
2009). 
3.2.4 .2  Financ ia l  dr iv ing  fo r c e s  
The costs for the public client are predetermined and predictable for a long period of 
time. Moreover, initial investment costs are rarely associated with PPP projects. Thus, 
the public client does not have to pay up-front for the construction cost of the facility 
but rather in distributed payments over the life cycle (L. Andersson & Sirén, 2009).  
 
In some countries, this payment mechanism of PPP has historically been utilised to 
bypass fiscal deficit, enabling investments in public infrastructure. Particularly European 
countries have utilised PPP this way. A common reason mentioned is to withstand the 
convergence criteria, or the Maastricht Treaty, signed by the member countries of the 
European Union in 1992. The Maastricht Treaty forbids fiscal deficits above 3 % and 
limits public debt to exceed 60 % of national GDP inter alia. The capital intensive nature 
of large infrastructure projects was as such financed by using PPP, causing less impact 
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on current fiscal policy or public debt (Arnek, Hellsvik, & Trollius, 2007; Cruz & 
Marques, 2013). However, a negative example of the long-term budget effects of utilising 
PPP this way is that of Portugal. In 1997 the country initiated PPP projects with shadow 
toll compensation in large scale around the country. Ten years later, the compensation 
for the very same projects was forecasted to exceed 700 million EUR, resulting in 
massive pressure on the public transport budget. Since then, national budget laws and 
regulations have been imposed. Furthermore, in 2004 Eurostat released regulations for 
how PPP projects should be addressed in national accounting, thereby reducing off-
budget solutions and lowering risk of overspending (International Transport Forum, 
2008). 
3.2.4 .3  Innovat ion  
With the SPV being responsible for the facility during the life cycle, the initial investment 
cost is often higher, which implies decreased maintenance and operating costs over time. 
Furthermore, the long contract time and subsequent incentives enable alternative 
approaches and technical innovations. In a long-term perspective, PPP can contribute to 
growth and knowledge transfer, with innovation as a consequence (L. Andersson & 
Sirén, 2009). 
 
In a study of eight infrastructure projects in Australia, it was concluded that credible 
evidence of technical- and design innovation had been derived from the use of PPP 
(Fitzgerald, 2004). In 2001 the Norwegian parliament decided to pursue with three road 
PPP pilot projects with the partial purpose of achieving innovation. The results have 
since then been evaluated and it has been reported that numerous accounts of 
innovation was found within the construction strategy, the organisation of the project, 
the contract and the financing of the project (Eriksen Sandberg, 2010). Furthermore, the 
recently elected Norwegian Prime Minister Erna Solberg has declared interest in 
additional PPP projects in the future. Solberg’s motive for using PPP is not the access to 
private funding but rather the private side’s expertise and ability to innovate (Gärdfors, 
2013). 
 
3.2.5 Risk allocation 
One of the main foundations on which PPP rests upon is that of risk allocation. Risk 
allocation typically occurs in any context where there is a degree of marketable 
uncertainty. Marketable, in that there is a discrepancy in both how two parties view the 
probability of an event to occur as well as the preference for taking on that uncertainty 
(Medda, 2007). 
 
In PPP, the public client specifies the risks to be shared, and the bidding parties 
thereafter submit their bids accordingly. The optimal allocation of risk is complex and 
there is no clear recipe on what risks should be borne by whom for each specific project 
(Medda, 2007). However, the main notion is that each risk should be allocated to the 
party best able to bear it (Cooper, Grey, Raymond, & Walker, 2005). While this may 
seem self-explanatory, determining the best abled party may differ depending on the 
criteria. Medda (2007) recognises the two common criteria to be a) the party best able to 
control or influence a risky outcome and b) the party best able to retain the risk at the 
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lowest cost. Consequently, a contractor satisfying the first criteria may very well not be 
satisfying the second criteria, hence the complexity of risk allocation.  
 
The consequences of deficient risk allocation could be increased capital costs and 
delayed projects. Such occurrences require renegotiations which often are found to be 
costly and long processes (Medda, 2007). As a reference, a study performed by the 
World Bank in Latin America showed that over 41% of concession contracts have been 
renegotiated between the years of 1985-2000 (Guasch, 2004). Furthermore, the 
renegotiation of a contract is a bilateral process between the contractor and the public 
client, thereby undermining the competitive bidding process that took place in the initial 
negotiations (Guasch, 2004).  
 
It is therefore in both parties’ interest that all associated risks are conveyed and 
understood by all parties in the negotiation process (Ke, Wang, Chan, & Lam, 2010). 
 
3.2.6 Public-Private Partnerships and Value For Money 
3.2.6 .1  The Publ i c  Sec tor  Comparator  
A central area in current research of PPPs is the question whether PPP means increased 
VFM compared to traditional procurement, a question in which the research landscape is 
tinged by ambiguity. The concept of VFM is defined as “where the benefits of risk transfer 
combined with private sector incentives, experience, and innovation outweigh the increased costs of 
contracting and financing seen under PPPs” (The World Bank, 2014).  
 
A widely used tool when deciding the VFM of a potential PPP project is the Public 
Sector Comparator (PSC). The PSC is essentially the accumulated price, for which the 
project could be realised by traditional procurement, which is compared to the 
accumulated price for the PPP alternative. A commonly used PSC model is illustrated in 
Figure 10 and contains the following components (Grimsey & Lewis, 2005): 
 
• Base cost: Includes capital and operating costs as well as a full and fair estimate of 
all the costs of delivering the same volume, performance and service as provided 
in the PPP alternative. 
• Transferable risk: Initially, a detailed risk calculation is conducted which is 
followed by an allocation of the risks. Finally, the value of the transferable risks 
is added to the PSC. This component is often a key determinant of VFM.  
• Retained risk: Any risk that is not transferred to the private party in the PPP is 
considered a retained risk and should be included in the PSC. 
• Competitive neutrality: An adjustment removing the net competitive advantage that 
a government entity has in regards to its public ownership. One such example is 
the costs that a PPP project incurs, effectively generating tax revenue to the 
government. This effect is thereby abolished. 
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Figure 10: PSC and Value For Money, as adopted by Grimsey & Lewis (2005) 
Despite its popularity, the PSC has been faced with criticism in several areas. One such 
area is the objectiveness of PSCs. The objectiveness of the PSC can be questioned as it 
can be manipulated to show a wide range of numbers. Furthermore, the necessity of a 
PSC is often questioned. Considering that calculating the PSC is a costly process, it could 
be argued that the PSC only is needed where PPP is new and untested. In other words, it 
might not be needed in countries where PPP has been widely used and certain 
experience has been gained as to its effectiveness and feasibility. On the other hand, the 
PSC is an important component in the decision-making process and often drives 
competitiveness solely by its existence (Grimsey & Lewis, 2005). 
 
The PSC remains as a theoretical bid of assumed cost, potentially with important areas 
left out. The PPP bid is on the other hand an actual firm bid, to which the bidders must 
commit contractually. When using the PSC approach to gain VFM, a comparison is only 
made once - before the project is realised. As the VFM of the project is likely to develop 
over time, it is highly relevant to examine the VFM over time as well. Examples of how 
to address this problem are to monitor on-going VFM and adjust prices after current 
market prices. Despite these shortcomings, the tool is considered to be the most valuable 
tool in supporting investment decisions and has gained worldwide popularity (Grimsey 
& Lewis, 2005). 
 
3.2.6 .2  Are Publ i c -Pr iva t e  Par tner sh ips  Value  For  Money?  
Hodge and Greve (2007) argue that a spectrum of PPP experience in terms of both 
success and failure can be observed around the globe, out of which some have delivered 
the many supposed benefits of PPP. Looking at the wide range of contradictory evidence 
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as to the VFM of PPPs, it is clear that decision makers are facing considerable 
uncertainty (Hodge & Greve, 2007). 
 
One of the main problems with assessing VFM is the fact that PPP first started emerging 
in the mid-1990. As such, the very long contracts have yet to be completed and thereby 
prevent VFM comparisons of the full life cycle (Blanc-Brude, Goldsmith, & Välilä, 
2006). Furthermore, the counterfactual is often complex to prove. The only way of 
concluding if superior VFM was achieved in a specific project, as compared to the 
counterfactual, is by hypothetically constructing a counterfactual alternative. It is thereby 
hard to compare the chosen alternative to what could have been chosen instead 
(International Transport Forum, 2008). 
 
Despite the controversies as to the VFM of PPPs and the complexity of performing such 
assessments, certain outcomes of PPP have been observed. The National Audit Office 
of United Kingdom has empirically concluded several effects of PPP (European 
Investment Bank, 2004). For example, a report commissioned by the Treasury Taskforce 
showed that the average estimated savings of PPP projects compared to PSC alternatives 
were 17 %. Furthermore, a study of 61 PPP projects concluded that 89 % of all projects 
were delivered on time or earlier than expected. Moreover, all of these projects were 
delivered within the public sector budget and 77 % of the public sector managers 
reported that initial expectations were met (European Investment Bank, 2004).  
 
In addition, the National Audit Office performed a survey of the public authorities’ 
perception of VFM in 98 PPP projects. The results showed that 75 % were on time or 
early and the public sector did not bear overrun cost in any of the projects. Additionally, 
81 % of the respondents believed that PPP projects deliver satisfactory or better VFM 
than what would have been achieved by traditional procurement (European Investment 
Bank, 2004).  
 
On the other hand, an empirical study of 227 observations in which 65 were PPP 
concluded that construction costs are on average 24 % higher for PPP projects (Blanc-
Brude et al., 2006). It should however be noted that the study solely examined 
construction costs and not the full life cycle. Furthermore, the authors provide possible 
explanations to the increased costs. One such is the fact that traditionally procured 
projects often fail to include and price the risks associated with construction. For PPP 
projects, the SPV will account for such risk and thereby price accordingly (Blanc-Brude 
et al., 2006). As a point of reference, the cost for bearing construction risk should in 
theory be closely correlated with the average cost of budget overruns for construction 
projects. (Flyvbjerg, Holm, & Buhl, 2002) found that the costs of EU road projects are 
22 % higher than the budgeted on average. (MacDonald, 2002) identified a similar 
number, 21 %, when examining large infrastructural projects across different sectors. As 
such, the higher construction cost of PPP projects is almost fully accounted for 
considering the risk of cost overrun taken by the SPV. If it is true that PPP contractors 
purposely build more expensive initially in order to reduce cost in the maintenance 
phase, it is even harder to justify that PPP is 24 % more expensive in practice (Blanc-
Brude et al., 2006).  
 
A Road to Success Under Construction? 
 
31 
In a study attempting to quantify the contract costs of PPPs, i.e. costs associated with 
upholding and maintaining a partnership, it was found that the contract costs on average 
make up for 10 % of the total capital value of a project. In particular, the costs concern 
technical, legal and financial advisory. The possible explanation given is that PPP 
contracts are longer-term and more complex, thereby harder to fully complete. While 10 
% may seem significant, the study does not consider or compare the transaction costs to 
traditional procurement (Dudkin & Välilä, 2005).  
 
Regardless of empirical evidence, the debate concerning PPP is often ideologically driven 
(De Bettignies & Ross, 2004). Summarised, the proponents claim that superior VFM in 
PPP projects is reached through efficiency gains as a result of a more holistic view and 
better risk allocation. Additionally, proponents claim that PPP projects are more often 
built within or before project deadlines thereby increasing the societal VFM. On the 
opposing side, the adversaries argue that financing a PPP project is more expensive since 
the government can borrow cheaper than a private party thereby reducing VFM with 
PPP. Furthermore, the opposes claim that the transaction costs are considerably higher 
with PPP projects (Arnek et al., 2007). Consequently, the general public scepticism 
towards private interests in public provision is something that occurs in regards to PPP 
as well. Opponents often claim that PPP contractors lift abnormal returns from the 
contracts, something that is hard to establish as a result of confidentiality and less 
transparency in private organisations. A research study on Latin American concessions 
however show that financial returns of private infrastructure concessions have delivered 
financial returns close to, or below the cost of capital (Guasch, 2004). 
 
3.2.7 Challenges and Pitfalls with Public-Private Partnerships 
PPP is merely one tool in the toolbox and can be more or less suitable for different 
projects. However, if it is concluded that PPP is a feasible option, there are associated 
challenges. L. Andersson and Sirén (2009) argue that there are several challenges when 
undertaking a PPP project. A new role and changing competence requirements makes 
the ability to in an early stage describe desired functions more complex. Consequently, 
the ability to procure a very complex overall solution in a coordinated way focusing on 
function is a hard task that requires experience. Related to this challenge is the ability to 
assess, calculate and allocate project risks over the life cycle. The last mentioned 
challenge is to formulate contracts regulating all parties’ commitments and compensation 
over the life cycle (L. Andersson & Sirén, 2009). From an overall perspective, the 
difficulty in establishing the foundations of a contract based on long-term forecasts is 
considered a major challenge. Furthermore, the transaction cost associated with 
conducting economic appraisal can be overwhelming for smaller public entities. As a 
result of these challenges, Cruz and Marques (2013) claim that contractual 
incompleteness is a common occurrence in PPP projects effectively opening up the 
possibility for opportunistic behaviour (Cruz & Marquez, 2013).  
 
3.2.8 Critical Success Factors for Public-Private Partnerships 
Critical Success Factors (CSF) are defined by Rockart (1982) as: “those few key areas of 
activity in which favourable results are absolutely necessary for a manager to reach his/her goals” 
(Rockart, 1982). When reviewing the many suggested CSFs for U.K. PPP projects, 
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Akintoye, Li, Edwards, and Hardcastle (2005) identified six major groups, consisting of 
18 critical success factors for realising PPP projects (Akintoye et al., 2005). These are 
presented below, supplemented with support from additional research; 
 
Effective procurement 
• Transparency in the procurement process: underlines the importance of maintaining 
effective and transparent communication with all parties involved in the PPP 
(Gentry & Fernandez, 1997; Jefferies, Gameson, & Rowlinson, 2002; Kopp, 
1997). 
• Competition in the procurement process: emphasises the importance of achieving a 
competitive bidding process and argues this can be done by a solid tender list, a 
clear requirements specification and maintained competitiveness throughout the 
procurement process (Gentry & Fernandez, 1997; Grimsey & Lewis, 2005; 
Jefferies et al., 2002; Joumard, Kongsrud, Nam, & Price, 2003; Kopp, 1997).  
• Good governance: implies accountability and clear governance as prerequisites for 
the administration of PPP projects and attracting investors (Badshah, 1998; 
Frilet, 1997; Qiao, Wang, Tiong, & Chan, 2001).  
• A well organised and committed public agency with essential management and technical 
skills as well as the capacity to negotiate is emphasised (Boyfield, 1992; Finnerty, 
2013; Jones, Zamani, & Reehal, 1996; McKee, Edwards, & Atun, 2006; Stein, 
1995).  
• Social support: the public acceptance of private involvement in public 
infrastructure is considered to be important (Frilet, 1997).  
• Shared authority between public and private sectors: a prerequisite for sustaining the 
long-term public-private cooperation enabling PPPs (Kanter, 1999; Stonehouse, 
Hudson, & O'Keefe, 1996). 	    
• Thorough and realistic assessment of the costs and benefits: highlights the importance of 
conducting long-term forecasting of cost and benefits, especially in regards to 
how uncertainty is treated and the comparison of the public and private 
alternatives (Brodie, 1995; Grimsey & Lewis, 2005; Hambros, Transportation, & 
Safety, 1999; Qiao et al., 2001). 
 
Project implementability 
• A favourable legal framework that fully allows and enables PPPs, is considered to be 
an essential condition for establishing successful PPPs (Bennett, 1998; Boyfield, 
1992; Jones et al., 1996; Stein, 1995). 
• Project technical feasibility refers to the importance of the private party being able to 
fully carry out all specified requirements (Badshah, 1998; Frilet, 1997; Qiao et al., 
2001). 
• Appropriate risk allocation and risk sharing: emphasises the ability to assess, calculate 
and allocate risk to the party in best position to manage it (Grant, 1996; Grimsey 
& Lewis, 2005; Qiao et al., 2001). 
• Commitment and responsibility of public and private parties: considers the parties’ ability 
to upbring and commit with the most beneficial resources in terms of both 
financial and human capital (Kanter, 1999; National Audit Office, 2001; 
Stonehouse et al., 1996). 
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• Strong private consortium: underlines the importance of the private parties’ ability to 
join together in strong consortiums drawing synergies from combining strengths 
and weaknesses (Birnie, 1999; Jefferies et al., 2002; Tiong, 1996). 
 
Government guarantee 
• Government involvement through guarantees: suggests that the provision of 
government guarantees lowers the risk and potentially financial costs while 
securing the cash flows for creditors (Kanter, 1999; Qiao et al., 2001; 
Stonehouse et al., 1996; Zhang, Wang, Tiong, Ting, & Ashley, 1998). 
• Multi-benefit objectives: addresses the importance of recognising and respecting 
multi-faceted objectives between the public and the private party. Typically, the 
public party strives for VFM while the private party is profit driven (Grant, 
1996). 
 
Favourable economic conditions 
• Stable macro-economic environment: emphasises the importance of stable and certain 
markets where the market risk premium is relatively low (Dailami & Klein, 1998; 
Qiao et al., 2001). 
• Sound economic policy: accentuates the need for a balanced governmental fiscal 
policy and the use of sound economic principles in decisions affecting currency 
and inflation (European Investment Bank, 2000). 
 
Available financial markets 
• Availability of financial markets: argues for the need of easily accessible capital, 
thereby implying lower cost of financing. Furthermore, the PPP expertise and 
experience of financiers is also considered important (Akintoye, Beck, 
Hardcastle, Chinyio, & Asenova, 2001; C McCarthy & LK Tiong, 1991; Jefferies 
et al., 2002; Qiao et al., 2001). 
 
Political support 
• It is argued that political support substantially affects the development and 
implementation of PPPs (Qiao et al., 2001; Zhang et al., 1998).  
 
In addition to these identified critical success factors, Leahy (2005) argues that 
knowledge transfer between procurement and contract departments allows further 
integration between the construction phase and the long-term contractual structure 
(Leahy, 2005). Another relevant perspective noted by Deloitte (2012) is that a clear 
pipeline, i.e. the systemised procedure for PPP projects, is considered to be the single 
most important factor that makes a market attractive (Deloitte, 2012). In regards to 
enhancing VFM from an efficiency perspective, International Transport Forum (2008) 
raises the issue of excessive governmental control in public procurement, with annual 
basis public budget allocation limiting long-term decision-making. The authors discuss 
enhanced autonomy in government agencies, still fully controlled by the government. 
However, the control is on an arm’s length basis, allowing clear specialisation for both 
the government and the agency. It is argued that benefits from devolving governmental 
control arise from specialisation of tasks and concentration of accountability for 
decision-making. This is achieved by an organisation created for the purpose of specific 
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infrastructure procurement, referring to the specialisation principles of Adam Smith. 
While the government expertise lies in transforming political will into policy, the 
procurement agency expertise lies in translating policy into implementation 
(International Transport Forum, 2008). 
 
3.3 The Swedish Context 
3.3.1 Public Procurement in Sweden 
The Swedish public procurement sector has an approximated yearly value of 500 billion 
SEK and is regulated by Lagen om Offentlig Upphandling (LOU). The purpose of the 
procurement legislation is to assure optimal use of public funds by benefitting from the 
competition on the market in question. The legislation also aims to grant the same terms 
of competition to contractors in each procurement project (Konkurrensverket, 2014b). 
 
Traditionally, infrastructure in Sweden is financed by state grants or loans from 
Riksgälden. In recent times a discussion of alternative financing of transport 
infrastructure has emerged. The reasons are several; difficulties to include desired 
infrastructure investments within the budget, to get more stable forms of finance than 
state grants, to reduce risk exposure of the state and to distribute infrastructure resources 
more evenly over generations. The discussions of possible financing solutions have 
mainly included (Ekonomistyrningsverket, 2006): 
 
• Extended use of loans from Riksgälden  
• State-guaranteed market loans 
• Contributions or loans from municipalities or other stakeholders 
• Infrastructure fees 
• Public-Private Partnerships  
 
3.3.2 Public-Private Partnerships in Sweden 
3.3.2 .1  Arlandabanan 
In the 1990s, investigations examining a train connection between Stockholm, Uppsala 
and Arlanda Airport were made. It was concluded that a partial extension of the original 
connection between Stockholm and Uppsala as well as two connections to Arlanda were 
needed (Nilsson, 2009). In regards to the choice of procurement form, it is stated that 
the reason for choosing PPP was financial (Ågren & Olander, 2013a). 
 
Bid and tender process 
In an open call for potential bidders, 80 responses were collected. Out of these 80, two 
consortia made it all the way to the final stage (Ågren & Olander, 2013a). In June 1994, 
Arlanda Link Consortium, later known as A-Train, was appointed as the winner of the 
contract (Nilsson, 2009). 
 
Contract 
The contract signed has a maturity of 45 years and is a concessionary agreement (Ågren 
& Olander, 2013a). The contract states that the equipment cost is to be covered by ticket 
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revenues. Since no requirements were stipulated, the full demand and revenue risk was 
carried by A-Train (Nilsson, 2009).  
 
Performance 
Since its inception, the project has been regularly debated among politicians. In regards 
to actual performance, the contract states that the SPV should uphold “good service 
standards”, which is rather vague. Compared to regional rail traffic, the trains operating 
Arlandabanan have had a punctuality of 95 % which is better than the 91 % performed 
by regional rail traffic. However, the project has failed to meet the initial traffic forecasts. 
In 2005, Arlandabanan had 4.6 million users compared to the forecasted 5.1 million 
(Ågren & Olander, 2013a). 
 
3.3.2 .2  Nya Karo l inska So lna 
In 2008, Stockholms Läns Landsting (SLL) decided to construct a new university 
hospital, Nya Karolinska Solna (NKS). The rationale behind this decision was the 
excessive restoration cost of the existing facility amounting to 7 billion SEK. The price 
of NKS was restricted to 14,1 billion SEK and was planned to be operable by December 
2015. The objective of NKS is to conduct health care, research and education by 
eminent standards and considerable magnitude while also allowing complex interaction 
between the separate operations (Nilsson, 2009). 
 
In October 2007, PwC released a report evaluating alternative finance and operation 
solutions for NKS. Among the concluding recommendations, PwC listed PPP to be 
more beneficial than traditional procurement for the following reasons (PwC, 2007b): 
 
• Probably better competition as a result of big international interest in the 
project. 
• The risks of exceeding costs and delay in 20-40 years are transferred to the SPV. 
• Better possibilities for innovative solutions in order to achieve long-term 
optimisation of maintenance and operating costs. 
• It forces SLL to closely analyse the functional specifications of NKS.  
• The external lenders perform a thorough due diligence on the SPV. 
• Lower legal, operational and commercial risks, although SLL will face higher 
demands as to the procurement process and monitoring. 
• Possibilities for changes and contract flexibility. 
• There is sufficient experience in Sweden in all parts of the PPP process. 
• The SPV will carry any cost exceeding the expected life cycle costs. 
 
PwC (2007b) also accentuated that in the event of choosing PPP as procurement form, 
the competence of the client, SLL, is highly important. An additional report performed 
by Ernst & Young (2008) furthermore recommended SLL to choose PPP as a 
procurement form, backed by numerical analysis similar to a PSC. 
  
Bid and tender process 
In a county council assembly held in June 2008, the executive committee of SLL 
proposed a vote between traditional procurement and PPP. The decision was to proceed 
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with PPP on the sub-clause that sufficient competition in the bidding process was 
reached (Lundberg, 2013). The initial interest was high and 47 requests for pre-
qualification documents were received (NKS-förvaltningen, 2010). However, only one 
bid was received in the final stage. In April 2010 the executive committee of SLL 
announced the winning consortia consisting of Skanska and Innisfree (Lundberg, 2013). 
In November 2010 the SLL audit committee reviewed the tender and bid process and 
concluded that competition was sufficient and in line with the public procurement act 
(SLL, 2010).  
 
Contract 
The contract signed with the SPV, Swedish Hospital Partners AB, expires in 2040 with 
the option of extending the contract for a total of 15 years. The total cost of 
construction is projected to 14,5 billion SEK and the total life cycle cost is approximately 
52,5 billion SEK (Nya Karolinska Solna, 2014). In order to reduce the financial costs 
associated with construction, it was agreed that SLL pays advance payments during 
construction thereby reducing the use of debt (Lundberg, 2013). 
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4 Assessing Sweden’s Public-Private Partnership 
Readiness 
This chapter assesses Sweden’s PPP readiness using the Economist Intelligence Unit Infrascope Index. 
A thorough evaluation of Sweden’s readiness in the six categories is presented, followed by a summarised 
score. Finally, the areas in which Sweden appears highly ready, the enabling factors, are briefly discussed 
and compared to critical success factors.  
 
The Infrascope Index is developed by Economist Intelligence Unit and assesses country 
capacity to carry out sustainable infrastructure PPPs. In the framework, the term PPP 
refers specifically to projects that involve a long-term contract between a public-sector 
body and a private-sector entity for the design, construction (or upgrading), operation 
and maintenance of public infrastructure. In the definition, private financing is usually 
included, as well as construction, operation, maintenance and availability or demand risk 
transfer. The index evaluates readiness and capacity by breaking down the PPP value 
chain into six categories (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2012):  
 
1) Legal and Regulatory Framework for PPP projects. 
2) Design and responsibilities of the Institutional Framework that prepares, awards 
and oversees projects. 
3) Operational Maturity, including the government’s ability to uphold PPP laws and 
regulations including the number and success rate of past projects. 
4) Investment Climate, including the business, political and social environment for 
investment  
5) Financial Facilities for funding infrastructure. 
6) In addition, to recognise regional level activity, the sixth category Sub-national 
Adjustment is included.  
 
These categories are comprised by 19 indicators, out of which 14 are based on qualitative 
data and the remaining 5 is based on quantitative data. The qualitatively based indicators 
are scored from 0-4 or 0-3 whereas the quantitative indicators are based on indices 
commonly scored 0-100. The results are thereafter transformed and weighted to give a 
total score for each category ranging from 0 to 100. A complete description of the 
Infrascope Index categories and indicators is found in Appendix B. Sweden’s assessment 
is hereby presented along with a brief description of the evaluation questions and scoring 
criteria for each indicator. 
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4.1 Regulatory framework   
4.1.1 Consistency and quality of PPP regulations 
 
Since PPP is a form of public procurement, it is regulated in LOU or Lagen om 
upphandling inom områdena vatten, energi, transporter och posttjänster (LUF). 
Although PPP is encompassed by current procurement regulation, there is no PPP 
specific regulation in LOU, nor in LUF. It can be questioned whether the procurement 
regulation in LOU is flexible enough to include PPP procurements in a satisfactory way. 
In open and selective procurement, the conditions and terms have to be stated before 
initiating the procurement. In such procurement, it is thereby forbidden to change 
contractual terms after the tendering process is initiated (Konkurrensverket, 2008). Since 
July 2010, LOU also encompass “competitive dialogue”, which means that the procuring 
entity and the contractor can discuss terms and requirements before bids are submitted 
(Kammarkollegiet, 2010). The condition is however that competitive dialogue can only 
be used instead of open or selective procurement in situations where contracts can be 
seen as especially complex. This measure has been deemed to enhance the flexibility 
required for PPPs in the procurement process (Konkurrensverket, 2008). In January 
2014, new EU directives were decided upon, which aim to further increase flexibility and 
allow a more strategic use of public procurement. The goal is that this legislation will be 
implemented in Sweden by spring 2016 (Socialdepartementet, 2014). 
 
Furthermore, PPPs can be procured through concessionary agreements, thereby 
increasing flexibility and the use of dialogue compared to an open or selective 
procurement contract. Whether a PPP project can be seen as a concessionary agreement 
is regulated through the utilisation right criteria, stating that a concession is defined as an 
operator taking all the risk for providing a service and also charging the end-user for 
doing so (Konkurrensverket, 2008). 
 
Even though PPPs are not specifically regulated within LOU, Trafikverket (TV) argues 
that when applying thorough transparency and planning in a project, PPP is currently 
regulated sufficiently (TV, 2014). This view is supported by Ågren and Olander (2013b), 
who argue that Swedish public procurement legislation does not limit PPPs (Ågren & 
Olander, 2013b). Finally, Nordic Investment Bank (NIB) argues that LOU does not fully 
regulate procurement of financial services (NIB, 2014).  
 
When looking at the procurement regulation issued by Byggandets Kontraktskommitté 
(BKK), it is evident that the framework does not contain any PPP counterpart to AB04, 
“General Conditions of Contract for Building and Civil Engineering Works and Building Services” or 
ABT06, “General Conditions of Contract for Design and Construct Contracts for Building, Civil 
Engineering and Building Services” (Nilsson, 2009).  
 
This indicator considers the consistency of laws and regulations for national-level PPP projects and 
whether regulations establish clear requirements and oversight mechanisms for project implementation. 
It also considers risk allocation principles and compensation principles. 
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Overall, the score for Sweden is 3 / 4 in this category. Current legislation is in general 
terms not a barrier for PPP projects. However, compared to countries scoring higher for 
this indicator, Sweden lacks specific regulations and definitions in regards to PPP. It 
should also be noted that current legislation was deemed insufficient and unclear for 
PPP before competitive dialogue came into force.  
 
4.1.2 Effective PPP selection and decision-making 
 
SLL argues that all procurement forms are evaluated when deciding on which 
procurement form to use (SLL, 2014) and Konkurrensverket (KKV) highlights the 
complete autonomy when making the choice (KKV, 2014). Sveriges Kommuner och 
Landsting (SKL) and PwC on the other hand argue that thorough evaluations do not 
always take place and that there is a need for more frequent and comprehensive 
evaluations (SKL, 2014; PwC, 2014). SKL furthermore argues that the traditional cost 
estimations rarely consider exceeding costs and delays (SKL, 2014). Statens väg och 
transportforskningsinstitut (VTI) concurs with SKL and PwC and believes that there is a 
need for support and evaluation tools among public decision makers (VTI, 2014). TV 
claims that there is still room for progress in regards to taking a life cycle perspective and 
the value of innovation into account in long-term decision-making. This issue stems 
mainly from a lack of interconnectivity between the construction department and the 
maintenance department, resulting in neglected life cycle costs in the construction phase. 
This separation is done mainly because of the annual basis of the public budget 
allocation (TV, 2014). 
 
When looking at formalised evaluation tools, there does not seem to exist a Swedish 
formal process similar to the PSC (SLL, 2014; SHP, 2014). Regarding evaluation 
methods, TV brings forth the processes of fact based decisions and alternative choice 
calculations, in which market analysis takes place examining project specific conditions 
and internal capabilities. However, there is no systematic quantitative methodology for 
evaluating PPP projects. TV also emphasises the need within the organisation to include 
the life cycle perspective in the evaluations (TV, 2014). In the case of NKS, PwC made 
Scoring evaluation criteria: 
0 = The legal framework is so cumbersome or restrictive that in practice national-level concessions are 
extremely difficult to implement. 
1 = The legal framework allows national-level concessions, but is ill-defined and risk allocation 
compensation is unclear and inefficient. 
2 = The legal framework allows national-level concessions and also establishes general, open-ended 
oversight, risk-allocation and compensation rules. 
3 = The legal framework is generally good and coherent, addressing risk-allocation issues while 
leaving some ambiguity with regards to compensation schemes and project implementation 
4 = The legal framework is comprehensive and consistent across sectors and layers of government, 
addresses risk-allocation and compensation issues according to strict economic principles, and 
establishes sophisticated and consistent oversight of project implementation. 
This indicator considers whether regulations establish efficient planning frameworks, proper 
accounting principles and appropriate cost-benefit analysis techniques.  
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an initial assessment of alternative procurement forms, concluding that PPP was an 
attractive alternative. This conclusion formed the basis for another assessment, similar to 
the PSC, conducted by Ernst & Young (2008). 
 
Even though calculations and assessments have been performed on specific projects, the 
lack of a standardised and formal assessment methods is evident. Based on the lack of 
such a systematic procedure for evaluating procurement forms in general and PPP in 
particular, Sweden scores 2 / 4 points in this indicator.  
 
4.1.3 Fairness/openness of bids and contract changes 
 
There are central principles in the Swedish procurement regulation, which aim to achieve 
a fair and open bidding process. The first two are the equal treatment and non-discriminating 
principles, aiming to treat all contractors in same manner by providing the same basis for 
competition. These principles prescribe release of contract or requirement information at 
the same time and place while strictly prohibiting direct or indirect discrimination. A 
third principle is the transparency principle, prescribing openness and predictability. 
Furthermore, tender documents should be explicit, include all of the requirements and 
cannot be changed (Konkurrensverket, 2014a). 
 
In June 2008 SLL decided to realise the NKS project in the form of PPP, with the 
condition that expected competition could be achieved. There was a profound initial 
interest for the contract with many international private actors attending the initial 
project road show, ending up with 47 requests for the pre-qualification documents. 
However, only one application for pre-qualification was received. After careful 
evaluation of the received application, the NKS management suggested to proceed with 
PPP, referring to the current financial situation, the size of the project, the limited 
number of construction companies and the fact that one bidder is in line with Swedish 
public procurement legislation (NKS-förvaltningen, 2010). In May, 2010, SLL decided to 
proceed despite the one bid, thus reasoning that the condition of expected competition 
had been met (M. L. Andersson, 2010). Why only one bid was received is frequently 
discussed and several respondents highlight the financial crisis in 2008 as a potential 
Scoring evaluation criteria: 
0 = Decision-making processes are not defined – they are erratic and subject to change, without 
accounting for liabilities. 
1 = Decision-making processes are defined, but are only occasionally followed, and accounting for 
liabilities is not well established. 
2 = Decision-making processes defined and upheld, but accounting principles are not adequate. 
3 = Proper decision-making is both defined and used for PPP project decisions, although accounting 
for liabilities should be improved for more consistent decisions. 
4 = PPP project selection is a consistent result of various efficiency, cost-benefit and social-evaluation 
considerations required by law and accompanied by rigorous accounting practices.  
This indicator considers whether national-level PPP projects unfairly favour certain project bidders 
and operators over others and whether objective criteria is used when evaluating bids. It also considers 
how contract changes are treated.  
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explanation (SLL, 2014; VTI, 2014; PwC, 2014). All in all, SHP describes the tendering 
process as very professional and states that the Skanska-led consortium had no clue that 
they were the only bidders (SHP, 2014).  
 
Regarding contract changes in the case of NKS, the facility management services are put 
to a market test every five years in order to assure maximum value for money. The 
savings resulting from a market test accrue to SLL (SHP, 2014). Furthermore, SLL is 
entitled to renegotiate the commercial bank loans. In case of renegotiation, 90 % of the 
cost savings will accrue to SLL (Stockholms Läns Landsting, 2012). 
 
TV argues that there are very few national players with sufficient financial resources and 
capabilities to carry out a major PPP project and that this might limit the Swedish PPP 
contract competition. On average, there is around 3,4 bidders on all announced contracts 
and around 3 on announced design and build contracts. There might be reason to believe 
that this number will be 1 or 2 for a PPP project, considering the increased complexity 
and the low number of domestic capable actors (TV, 2014). 
 
Sweden scores 4 / 4 points in this category. This score particularly derives from the 
current Swedish procurement regulation, which aim to achieve a fair and open bidding 
process. For example, The equal treatment and non-discriminating principles aiming to treat all 
contractors in same manner by providing the same basis for competition, is something 
that is considered a positive addition to this indicator. Furthermore, the transparency 
principle that prescribes openness and predictability also support the full score. Moreover, 
no indication can be found that the one bid on the NKS contract was a consequence of 
insufficient or inadequate competition principles in the tendering process.  
 
4.1.4 Dispute-resolution mechanisms 
 
In regards to the fact that Sweden has realised very few PPP projects, each project’s 
possibility of dispute resolution is established on a contract-to-contract basis. For general 
procurement contracts such as AB04 or ABT06, arbitration clauses are already included 
making way for efficient dispute resolution possibilities.  
Scoring evaluation criteria: 
0 = Regulations unfairly favour certain bidders over others, transparency requirements are not in 
place and contracts are changed in a discretionary manners. 
1 = Regulations introduce some bias toward particular parties, and bidding, transparency and 
renegotiation schemes are poor 
2 = Project bidding is fair and transparent, but renegotiations and expansions are regulated poorly 
3 = Regulations generally define a fair playing field, with considerations for contract expansion, 
renegotiation and adjustments 
4 = Regulations establish fair and transparent bidding procedures, set limits to renegotiations and 
adjustments, and require independent oversight of post-award procedures. 
This indicator considers whether fair and transparent mechanisms for resolving controversies between 
the state and the operator exist, whether the law provides technically adequate and efficient 
conciliation schemes and whether arbitration ruling proceed according to law and contracts. 
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Due to the confidentiality of the contract used in NKS, it is hard to establish whether 
proper dispute resolution mechanisms were included in the final contract. However, 
based on the recommendations brought forth from the initial report by PwC, it was 
recommended that the contract should be drafted with inspiration from AB04 and 
ABT06 as well as from PPP contracts used in the United Kingdom. Furthermore, the 
report recommended dispute resolution in a court of arbitration rather than the usual 
court of law. The main reason given is that arbitration rulings are more time efficient 
than regular court procedures. More specifically, the report recommended the Stockholm 
Chamber of Commerce (SCC) Arbitration Institute to settle disputes (PwC, 2007a). In 
the case of NKS it has been confirmed that the contract was drafted and translated on 
the basis of PPP contracts used in the United Kingdom (SLL, 2014).  
 
It however remains unclear whether a dispute resolution clause, regulating the use of the 
arbitration institute to SCC, was imposed in the final contract. Nonetheless, the 
capabilities in Sweden in general and the capabilities of the SCC Arbitration Institute in 
particular, can be considered high quality. According to Michelson and Sabbagh (2006), 
the arbitration institute of SCC is well recognised and one of the more renowned 
arbitration institutes across the world. Historically, arbitration rulings have been 
conducted in disputes with parties from more than 40 countries (Michelson & Sabbagh, 
2006). Furthermore, the Swedish business community’s use of arbitration as a means to 
solve disputes is widely accepted and has a long standing (Lundblad, 2008). As an 
example, 61 % of respondents chose the preferred method of dispute resolution to be 
arbitration, as recorded in the 2014 Roschier Disputes Index based on answers by 133 of 
the largest companies in the Nordics (Roschier, 2014). 
 
In regards to the legislation and the practices used in Swedish procurement in terms of 
dispute resolution, it remains clear that Sweden is well equipped. For these reasons, 
Sweden is awarded a score of 4 / 4 in this indicator.  
 
 
Scoring evaluation criteria: 
0 = Dispute-resolution systems for PPPs are undefined and insufficient 
1 = Dispute-resolution mechanisms exist, but these are not transparent or efficient. 
2 = Adequate dispute-resolution mechanisms exist, but arbitration and appeals are lengthy and 
complex 
3 = Comprehensive, effective dispute-resolution mechanisms exist, incorporating necessary technical 
considerations 
4 = Effective and efficient dispute-resolution mechanisms establish independent arbitration according 
to law and contracts, without lengthy appeals and with accompanying viable prejudicial reconciliation 
options.  
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4.2 Institutional framework 
4.2.1 Quality of institutional design  
 
As of 1 July 2014, KKV is the unit for support in public procurement in Sweden, a task 
that has partially been transferred from Kammarkollegiet. This task includes developing 
and maintaining support for public procurement, contributing to digital and standardised 
procurement process as well as developing and distributing tools and methods 
(Konkurrensverket, 2014d). KKV confirms this role and means that the new assignment 
will include general information and support for PPP projects. The tasks of detailed 
advising in on-going or planned PPP projects and evaluation of procurement forms are 
however not included in KKV’s new assignment. The task of outcome evaluation is 
spread on several authorities; Riksrevisionen, Ekonomistyrningsverket and 
Kammarkollegiet (KKV, 2014). Furthermore, TV questions KKV’s ability to oversee 
PPP projects of considerable size in the immediate future since KKV has not yet fully 
adopted the task as supporting unit. A solution to the support problem could be a 
collaboration between several authorities, something that currently does not exist (TV, 
2014). 
 
SHP argues that Sweden is not ready for PPP in terms of governmental competence and 
support (SHP, 2014). VTI concurs and believes that municipalities above all would 
benefit from increased government support in PPP procurement (VTI, 2014).  
 
Considering that KKV has not yet adopted the support role to full extent and the spread 
in accountability among agencies for support of PPP planning, monitoring and follow-
up, Sweden scores 2 / 4 points in this category.  
 
 
This indicator evaluates the existence and role of necessary agencies for proper project oversight and 
planning at the federal level, such as PPP boards and PPP advisory agencies. It also considers the 
oversight role and involvement of government budget and planning offices. 
Scoring evaluation criteria: 
0 = PPP-specific agencies or boards do not exist and relevant institutions in this sector lack 
accountability and independence from rent seekers. 
1 = Some oversight and checks and balances exist, but these are not comprehensive and agencies are 
highly prone to political distortion 
2 = Agencies exist and are fairly technical in nature, but do not play all necessary roles for 
comprehensive sectoral oversight 
3 = The necessary agencies exist and generally fill all necessary roles for sector oversight, although 
their structure and roles could be improved 
4 = The institutional design establishes satisfactory oversight and planning agencies, and incorporates 
check and balances so as to ensure effective planning and regulation, and increase accountability. 
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4.2.2 PPP contract, hold-up and expropriation risk  
 
As previously mentioned, PPP is regulated through LOU (Konkurrensverket, 2008). In 
regards to the few PPP projects carried out in Sweden, the legal experience regarding 
contracts is scarce. What can be considered though, is the overall legal situation in 
Sweden. Sweden is ranked third worldwide by the World Justice Project (WJP) in their 
Rule of Law Index 2014. The index targets 99 countries around the world with the goal 
to measure how the rule of law is practiced in everyday life. For the 2014 rankings, 
government accountability is strong (3rd), corruption minimal (4th), and fundamental 
rights are strongly protected (1st). Sweden’s administrative agencies and courts are rated 
among the most effective and transparent in the world (World Justice Project, 2014). 
However, in the 2014 Doing Business Rankings published by The World Bank, Sweden 
is placed 34th in the category “Protecting investors” and 25th in the category “Enforcing 
Contracts” (Doing Business, 2014).  
 
Aside from the overall legal situation, the Swedish legislation regarding public 
procurement provides an expedite mechanism in how to replace failed operators to 
protect creditors’ rights. When projects are procured through LOU, a new procurement 
procedure has to take place when the failed operator is to be replaced 
(Konkurrensverket, 2008).  
 
For the reasons stated above, Sweden’s judiciary ability to effectively enforce PPP 
operator and investor rights and arbitration rulings, is considered to be positive. Sweden 
thereby scores 4 / 4 points in this category.  
 
 
This indicator considers whether the judiciary enforces property rights and arbitration rulings. It also 
considers whether investors can appeal against rulings by regulators, expedite contract transfer for 
project exit and obtain fair compensation for early termination.  
Scoring evaluation criteria: 
0 = The judiciary is a poor enforcer of private operator and investor rights and arbitration rulings, 
and there is no effective appeals process 
1 = The judiciary occasionally upholds PPP operator and investor rights and arbitration rulings, but 
in an inefficient manner 
2 = The judiciary usually upholds contracts, PPP operator and investor rights and arbitration 
rulings, but hold-ups are common 
3 = The judiciary consistently and effectively upholds contracts and allows for appeals to regulator 
rulings, ensures fair compensation for early termination and transfer of contracts, although delays 
occur and can generate hold-up risk 
4 = The judiciary effectively enforces PPP operator and investor rights and arbitration rulings, 
allowing for expedited contract transfers and ensuring that early termination occurs only in 
exceptional public-interest circumstances, with fair compensation to the operator and protection to 
creditors.  
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4.3 Operational maturity  
4.3.1 Public capacity to plan and oversee PPPs 
 
There are several opinions as to Sweden’s PPP capacity. Several respondents claim it to 
be insufficient as a logical consequence of inexperience and habit (FD, 2014; SHP, 2014; 
Coor, 2014; SKL, 2014; PwC, 2014). Lack of qualified departmental support and 
competence is further emphasised (SHP, 2014). FD highlights the associated risk of 
insufficiently competent municipalities and county councils being exploited by private 
consortiums (FD, 2014). However, there seems to be a more solid competence among 
county councils than municipalities in general (Skanska, 2014a; KKV, 2014). As brought 
forth previously, TV believes the life cycle perspective can be improved in long-term 
planning - an issue stemming from the lack of interconnectivity between the 
construction department and the maintenance department. However, the organisation is 
moving towards a pure client-role and thus specifying requirements more in terms of 
function, leaving the contractors to construct a suitable long-term solution. TV believes 
it is ready for PPP in a near future in regards to all of its components except the 
financing (TV, 2014) 
 
Despite the seemingly inadequate PPP capacity, the competence in the few observable 
examples of Swedish realised PPP projects is described as substantial and considerable as 
to the bidding and negotiation processes (SLL, 2014; SHP, 2014; Coor, 2014; PwC, 
2014). However, it appears that the public incapacity has been supplemented by 
recruiting or acquiring competence from external advisors (SKL, 2014; VTI, 2014; PwC, 
2014). In the case of NKS, SHP argues that the competent public PPP organisation was 
a consequence of a) the adaptation and translation of a United Kingdom contract and b) 
competent employees of SLL. 
 
In regards to the lack of PPP specific agencies or membership in there of, the score for 
Sweden is low. Furthermore, there is no tradition of using PPP for procuring projects 
thereby causing inexperience across the public organisations. Instead, relevant 
competence has for specific projects been acquired through the use of advisory firms. In 
this respect, Sweden scores 2 / 4 points in this category.  
This indicator considers public capabilities for planning, design/engineering, environmental 
assessment, oversight of national-level projects service standards and conflict resolution. Also considers 
if there is public expertise on project financing, risk evaluation and contracts design.  
Scoring evaluation criteria: 
0 = Federal agencies do not have any of the necessary expertise or experience. 
1 = Federal agencies have very limited project expertise and experience. 
2 = Federal agencies have some project planning, design and financing expertise or experience, and 
oversee service quality to a limited extent. 
3 = Federal agencies generally have the necessary comprehensive project planning, design and 
financing expertise and experience, exhibiting moderate service quality oversight capacity. 
4 = Federal agencies have the necessary expertise and experience and effectively regulate the sector on 
a consistent basis. 
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4.3.2 Methods and criteria for awarding projects 
 
LOU explicitly prescribes that the allowed basis of evaluation for the Request for 
Quotation in a public procurement procedure is either a) the lowest price or b) the 
financially most beneficial bid (Konkurrensverket, 2014a). Furthermore, LOU states that 
the final contract award has to be supported with adequate evidence. Thus it is not 
sufficient to solely state that the winning bidder had the most financially sound bid. A 
decision taken on such ground has to be further supported with evidence of the 
circumstances that the decision maker has taken into consideration. After the contract is 
awarded to the winning bidder, all other bidders are informed and consequently have ten 
days to appeal the decision (Konkurrensverket, 2014c). The use of competitive dialogue 
also suggests that fair economic deals are reached in consent more easily. SKL confirms 
the use of competitive dialogue in municipalities and county councils in PPP projects, 
thereby increasing the chance of coming up with fair economic deals (SKL, 2014).  
 
Due to the sole bid on the NKS project, it is hard to establish whether or not the project 
was awarded on fair economic principles, even though the project has been faced with 
scrutiny in media. One of the more debated issues is the actual cost per square meter in 
relation to other hospitals built around the world. A report conducted by the consulting 
firm McKinsey stated that the cost was 46 000 SEK per square meter, which was stated 
to be as much as 50 % higher than the cost for other newly built hospitals in Europe and 
America. In specific, the average cost per square meter in SEK was found to be 17 000 
for Spain, 29 000 for Sweden, 32 000 for USA and 44 000 for UK (Tottmar, 2013). SLL 
however claims that such a comparison is flawed considering the fact that a PPP project, 
which includes so much more than construction, is compared to traditionally procured 
projects (SLL, 2014). Furthermore, the hospital is indeed built for top quality health care, 
such as almost exclusively having one-patient rooms, thereby preventing spread of 
disease with reduced health care bills as a result (Tottmar, 2013). Skanska also witnesses 
of the demand for high quality, claiming that large parts of the hospital is built very 
flexible for remodelling. As an example, the floors are made thicker to endure three 
times the pressure compared to usual flooring, so that heavy research equipment can be 
used if needed (Skanska, 2014). All in all, VTI means that increased transparency and 
openness in the NKS project would have been desirable (VTI, 2014). 
 
Considering Sweden’s solid legislation when it comes to using objective economic 
evaluation criteria and the somewhat insufficient transparency, Sweden scores 3 / 4 
points in this indicator.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
This indicator considers the track record of federal agencies using competitive bidding and objective 
economic factors as the primary consideration in final project and contract awards.  
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4.3.3 Regulators’ risk-allocation record  
 
VTI claims that Swedish municipalities have a history of realising PPP projects with 
insufficient risk transfer (VTI, 2014). In the case of Arlandabanan, the risk allocation was 
both clear and ambitious; the full demand and revenue risk was to be carried by A-Train. 
As it turned out, the actual revenue was about 20 % lower than expected. Two debated 
causes of this outcome are a) the fact that Bromma Airport remained open for flight 
traffic despite a political promise/indication of shut-down and b) that the E4.65 highway 
to Arlanda Airport was reconstructed/expanded during the time Arlandabanan was 
completed. This risk allocation structure has faced criticism in evaluations (Nilsson, 
2009).  
 
In the case of NKS, no outcome can be observed today as to the success of the risk 
allocation. However, the contract regarding the financial structure had to be 
renegotiated, resulting in the construction of NKS being co-funded to 50% by advance 
payments from the state (SHP, 2014). 
 
Although the risk was shared to some extent in the case of Arlandabanan, it has been 
criticised and seen as a sub-optimal allocation. When also considering the renegotiation 
in NKS, the track record cannot be seen as flawless. Thus, the score for Sweden is 3 / 4 
points in this indicator. 
Scoring evaluation criteria: 
0 = The granting agency awards projects based on subjective considerations and does not use 
objective, economic variables. 
1 = The granting agency has a poor track record, but does consider economic factors with some limits 
to discretion. 
2 = The regulator considers economic criteria to award projects, although these are not always the 
most efficient and appropriate ones, and subjective factors still play an important role. 
3 = The regulator has a good track record that could be improved (i.e. it uses economic variables, but 
does not give these priority over other factors). 
4 = The regulator has an excellent track record and uses economic criteria in an effective, transparent 
and consistent manner. 
This indicator considers whether the allocation of risk between the state and private sector has been 
successful for national PPP project in recent years. It also considers the effectiveness of guarantees and 
performance bonds. 
Scoring evaluation criteria: 
0 = Risk allocation is often handled inappropriately. 
1 = Risk has been allocated properly only on certain occasions, as evidenced by a high incidence of 
contract renegotiation, and hedging and insurance instruments have been minimally used. 
2 = Risk is usually distributed fairly between the state and the operator, but renegotiations are still 
common and financial instruments, such as insurance, guarantees and performance bonds, are 
occasionally used. 
3 = Risk has been fairly distributed, renegotiations have been moderate and parties employ some 
financial risk-hedging practices. 
4 = Risk has been consistently allocated correctly between the state and the private sector to minimise 
renegotiations, with extensive and effective use of financial instruments. 
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4.3.4 Experience in transport, water and electricity projects 
 
Since Sweden is not registered in the PPI database, the score is derived from the amount 
of known PPP projects. A project is counted if a) the total investments exceed 1 million 
USD, b) the private party own at least 25%, c) the project has reached financial closure 
since year 2000, d) the project provides services to the public either directly or indirectly.  
 
To the best of knowledge, the only projects that meet these criteria are Arlandabanan 
and NKS. The only additional source of information regarding projects on a municipal 
level is a study conducted in 1998. The study concluded that in the examined 64 
municipalities (out of 280), there was 117 records of PPP projects (Collin, 1998). 
However, these are considered too small and insignificant to provide relevant experience 
for Sweden.  
 
Croatia was in the 2012 Infrascope given a score of 2,2 for two registered PPP projects 
while Georgia was given a score of 4,4 also by conducting two PPP projects. In this 
respect, it seems justified to give Sweden a similar score. However, considering that NKS 
is one of the largest PPP projects ever agreed upon, Sweden is given a score of 5 for this 
indicator.  
 
4.3.5 Quality of transport, water and electricity projects  
 
This indicator will provide a maximum score of 1 to countries with less than five PPP 
projects. Although both PPP projects in Sweden have endured an intense debate, the 
projects are not under severe distress nor have failed. As such, the scoring for this 
indicator is 1 / 4. 
 
 
This indicator shows the number of transport, water and electricity concession projects in the past ten 
years in each country, as recorded by the World Bank’s Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) 
database. Scoring is conducted on the basis of raw data, where a higher number of projects is better. 
Scoring evaluation criteria: 
0 = For countries with five or more projects in the PPI database, this indicates a project 
failure/distress rate of above 20%. For countries with fewer than five projects, this indicates a 
failure/distress rate of 25% or above. 
1 = For countries with five or more projects in the PPI database, this indicates a project 
failure/distress rate of between 14% and 20%. For countries with fewer than five water and 
transport projects, this indicates a 0% failure/distress rate. 
2 = Failure/distress rate of between 8% and 14%. 
3 = Failure/distress rate of between 3% and 8%. 
4 = Failure/distress rate of between 0% and 3% 
This indicator evaluates the distress and failure rate of transport, water and electricity PPP projects 
over the past ten years.  
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4.4 Investment climate 
4.4.1 Political distortion 
 
To estimate the level of political distortion affecting the private sector in Sweden, a 
weighted average of three indices is used. These are the Public Sector Ethics Index 
(PSEI), the Political Instability Index (PII) and the Government Policy Effectiveness 
Index (GPEI). In order to make up for obsolete data, the indices have been 
supplemented where applicable.  
 
The PSEI is calculated by the World Bank. It is intended to measure the incidence of 
honesty among politicians, nepotism in public procurement and average frequency of 
bribes among other variables. The scores are derived from questionnaires sent to firms in 
the participating countries. According to the most recent publicly available report from 
2004, Sweden scored 84 on a grade from 0-100 (Kaufmann, 2004). While there is reason 
to believe this score has remained relatively stable since then, the score is supplemented 
with similar data from the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 
(CPI). In the 2013 CPI, Sweden scored 89 on a scale of 0-100 ranking third among 177 
countries (Transparency International, 2013). 
 
The Economist Intelligence Unit (2009b) defines The Political Instability Index as “the 
level of threat posed to governments by social protest”. The underlying scores are made up of 
combined measurements in regards to economic distress and exposure to public unrest. 
The latest publicly available score for the PII is that of 2012, where Sweden scored 95 
(World Bank Institute, 2013b). 
 
Furthermore, the Economist Intelligence Unit maintains a ranking in regards to 
government policy effectiveness. This ranking aims to quantify the level of excess 
bureaucracy as well as to capture institutional effectiveness (World Bank Institute, 
2013a). The most recent found score for Sweden was that of 2012, where Sweden scored 
88 on a scale ranging from 0 to 100 (World Bank Institute, 2013b).  
 
Overall, Sweden has historically been a politically stable country. As mentioned in the 
method, up-to-date numbers have been hard to obtain. This score should therefore just 
act as an indication of where Sweden would score when using more accurate and actual 
data. Thereby the estimated score for Sweden would be 89/100 points for this indicator. 
 84 + 89 + 95 + 884 = 89 
 
This indicator evaluates the level of political distortion affecting the country’s private sector.  
Scoring evaluation criteria: 
The score is a weighted average of the Economist Intelligence Unit’s political stability and 
governmental policy effectiveness risk scores, and the World Bank public sector ethics index. Scores 
range from 0 to 100, where 0=worst and 100=best. 
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4.4.2 Business environment  
 
To evaluate the quality of the general business environment of infrastructure projects in 
Sweden, a weighted average of the Corporate Ethics Index (CEI), by the World Bank, 
and The Economist Intelligence Unit´s market opportunities and macroeconomic index 
will be used. 
 
The CEI is a combination of two other World Bank indices called Corporate Illegal 
Corruption Component (CICC) and the Corporate Legal Corruption Component 
(CLCC). These indices aim to measure the existence of bribes in procurement and 
policy-making as well as private influential power on public decision makers. The CEI 
score of 2004 in Sweden was 77 in a score ranging from 0 to 100 (Kaufmann, 2004). 
There is no reason to believe this score has significantly changed since then. 
 
The business environment index from the Economist Intelligence Unit is a global 
ranking among the world’s 60 largest countries. To derive this index, a model is used 
based on 70 factors across 10 categories. The result is a score which indicate the quality 
or attractiveness of the business environment within the country. The index is developed 
every five years and Sweden scored 8,35 in a score ranging from 0-10 measured between 
the years of 2005 to 2009 (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2009a). Since this period was the 
most recent publicly available ranking found, the data will be supplemented with two 
additional indices on business environment. For comparability, the score is transformed 
to the range 0-100 by multiplying the score with 10, effectively resulting in 83,5. 
 
The first supplementary index used is the Doing Business rankings published by the 
World Bank. The aim of the index is to measure regulation and the ease of doing 
business within a country across a spectra of eleven topics such as dealing with 
construction permits, enforcing contracts and obtaining credit for example (Doing 
Business, 2014). For 2014, Sweden scored 82,96 in a score ranging from 0 to 100 (Doing 
Budiness, 2014) 
 
Finally, the Global Competitiveness Index published by the World Economic Forum is 
used. The index assesses the competitive landscape of 148 countries and provides an 
insight in the productivity and other factors of each country. In 2014, Sweden scored 
5,48 on a scale ranging from 1-7, ranking 6th country overall (World Economic Forum, 
2014). In order to make the data more comparable, it is transformed to a scale ranging 
from 0-100 by dividing 5,48 with 7 and thereafter multiplying the result with 100. 
Consequently, the score obtained from this index is 78. 
 
Sweden can be considered to be a country with ease of doing business in. Due to the 
obsoleteness of publicly available data, the original indices have been supplemented with 
similar but more recent indices. Combining the four scores, the average score for this 
indicator is thereby 80. 
This indicator evaluates the quality of the general business environment for infrastructure projects.  
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 77 + 83 + 83 + 784 = 80 
 
4.4.3 Political will 
 
When the current government was selected, the inaugural statement of intent was to 
develop alternative financing methods for infrastructure. A report of potential PPP 
projects was conducted and promoted, but shortly after these actions in 2008, the 
interest faded (Cars, Malmsten, & Witzell, 2011). 
 
The government is today skeptical to the use of PPP with the main opponents being 
within FD with Finansminister, Anders Borg, in the forefront. Borg’s main concern is 
the cost of private capital compared to loaning from Riksgälden. Furthermore, the mixed 
evaluation results where no clear support or evidence of effective PPP benefits has been 
proved is also an argument used (Borg, 2014). 
 
Even if the government has a unified stance, PwC believe that the discussion is divided 
in two camps, regardless of political colour (PwC, 2014). This is supported by Skandia, 
who believes that C, FP and KD are in favour of PPP while V, S and M are opposing it. 
MP remains neutral standing behind the argument that no one borrows cheaper than the 
state (Skandia, 2014). SHP however argues that there is a lack of understanding among 
decision makers what PPP really is, resulting in agitation for the term. Furthermore, the 
NKS project is described to pioneer the future of PPPs in Sweden. If the project turns 
out successful, more PPP projects is believed to occur in Sweden in the future (SHP, 
2014). Respondents also witness of the political game surrounding PPP, where higher-
ranking politicians that are against PPP affect local municipalities and county councils, 
even though those institutions are free to choose procurement method (SKL, 2014). 
Since the ruling government is clearly against PPP and none of the opposition parties 
advocate PPP, the debate and discussion is dead on the political agenda (FD, 2014). 
 
Considering the explicit negative standpoint from FD and Finansminister Anders Borg 
and the subsequent effect this has on decision makers, Sweden scores 1 / 3 points in this 
category.  
Scoring evaluation criteria: 
The score is a weighted average of the Economist Intelligence Unit’s market opportunities and 
macroeconomic risk scores, and the World Bank corporate ethics index. Scores range from 0 to 100, 
where 0=worst and 100=best. 
This indicator evaluates the level of political consensus, or will, to engage private parties in PPPs and 
to provide favourable implementation frameworks across sectors. 
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4.5 Financial facilities  
4.5.1 Government payment risk 
 
In the sense of financial capacity, Sweden is one of the most financially sound countries 
in the world. Rated AAA by S&P (Standard & Poor's, 2014b) and Fitch (Reuters, 2014) 
and Aaa by Moody’s (Moody's, 2013), it is clear that the government of Sweden is a 
stable partner financially. In fact, Sweden is one of only eleven countries worldwide that 
maintains the highest credit rating from all three rating institutes (Blaine, 2013). The 
county councils are also highly rated. As an example, SLL was rated AA+ in 2012 
(Standard & Poor's, 2012). 
 
In the sense of infrastructural projects, it is the responsibility of Riksgälden to provide 
guarantees and loans on a state level. Of the total outstanding guarantees of 
approximately 35 billion SEK, 20 billion SEK is related to guarantees for the Öresund 
Bridge (Riksgälden, 2014b). In terms of PPP projects, Riksgälden has issued a loan as 
well as a liquidity and capital adequacy guarantee to the Arlandabanan project. The loan 
of 1 billion SEK was given to the private SPV, A-Train AB, where repayment is 
dependent on financial results, while the guarantee was given to state-owned 
Arlandabanan Infrastructure AB (Riksgälden, 2014a).  
 
Considering Sweden’s strong credit ratings, it appears highly unlikely that the 
government would not honour contracted agreements. The governmental payment risk 
is therefore very low and Sweden scores 4 / 4 points in this category.  
 
Scoring evaluation criteria: 
0 = The government has consistently expressed a lack of interest or inconsistent intentions in 
engaging private participation through concessions or improving frameworks. Conditions for private 
investment are hostile. 
1 = The government has shown some reluctance to engage private participation through concessions 
and provide favourable frameworks, either because of disagreement among, or explicit opposition 
from, significant political groupings. 
2 = There is a political consensus surrounding the need to engage private participation through 
concessions (and provide favourable frameworks, although implementation is slow). 
3 = There is political consensus to maintain favourable frameworks and to be pro-active with 
concession projects, where appropriate, and the likelihood of major political delays is low. 
This indicator considers whether the government regularly fulfils obligations for PPP contracts or uses 
liquidity-guarantee schemes to reduce non-payment risk. It also considers Economist Intelligence 
Unit’s sovereign debt risk ratings. 
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4.5.2 Capital market for private infrastructure finance 
 
The capital market for private infrastructural financing is well-developed in Sweden. As 
an example, NKS has been financed to 85 % by loans. These are distributed through a 
consortium of commercial banks (44 % or 4390 MSEK), the Nordic Investment Bank 
(12% or 1181 MSEK) and the European Investment Bank (29 % or 2872 MSEK). The 
interest rate for the loans is fixed at 3,86% for the entire contractual period (SLL, 2012). 
Svenska Handelsbanken (SHB) comments that they have no specific opinion on PPP in 
general but that loans to such projects is a product that they offer and are willing to 
provide as long as the project is right (SHB, 2014). Furthermore, Skandia expresses an 
interest for investing in Nordic PPP projects directly as well as indirectly through 
infrastructure funds. On a global level, a recent survey among institutional investors 
showed that 58 % were planning to allocate investments to infrastructure (Standard & 
Poor's, 2013). 
 
In order to assess the overall capital market, the availability of debt and hedge 
instruments needs to be taken into consideration. In terms of long-term debt 
instruments such as corporate bonds, the total amount outstanding was 230 billion SEK 
in 2012 (Riksbanken, 2013). For hedging purposes, the interest-rate and exchange-rate 
markets are also found to be strong in Sweden. A common way of hedging interest rate 
is by the use of IMM-FRAs (International Money Market Forward Rate Agreements) 
and turnover per day for these interest rate instruments amounted to 185 billion SEK in 
2012. In the same year, exchange-rate instruments amounted to a turnover per day of 
332 billion SEK (Riksbanken, 2013). 
 
The Swedish capital market remains a strong one and the country was one of the best 
performing countries through the financial crisis in 2008. The banks stand strong 
compared to banks in countries that have received high scores for this indicator, and 
there seems to be interest from banks as well as pension companies to invest in PPP 
projects. As a result, the score for Sweden is 4 / 4 points in this indicator. 
 
Scoring evaluation criteria: 
0 = The government struggles to fulfil obligations to concessionaires. 
1 = The government occasionally fulfils obligations. 
2 = The government usually fulfils obligations. 
3 = the government usually fulfils obligations, and provides some minimal guarantees to investors. 
4 = The government has an excellent track record of fulfilling obligations, and provides strong 
guarantees to investors.  
Please note: in certain cases where project- or sector-specific information was not obtainable, scoring 
considers the Economist Intelligence Unit’s sovereign debt risk ratings. For these instances, scoring 
employs the following guidelines: 0=rating of CCC and below, 1=B rating, 2=BB rating, 3=BBB 
and A rating, and 4=AA or AAA rating. 
This indicator aims to capture how available and reliable long-term debt instruments are for 
infrastructure financing. Is there a developed insurance and pension market with useful products for 
infrastructure risk reduction? Are interest-rate and exchange-rate hedging instruments available? 
A Road to Success Under Construction? 
 
54 
4.5.3 Marketable debt 
 
As one can expect in connection with the above, Sweden has a well-developed bond 
market. For the covered bonds market, i.e. bonds backed by mortgages, Sweden is the 
fourth largest market globally. Approximately 75 % of the issued bonds are in SEK. 
With the use of market makers, primarily the commercial banks, the second hand bond 
market remains liquid and the daily turnover on this market was 13 billion SEK in 2012. 
This can be put into relation to the total outstanding value of covered bonds, which was 
1940 billion SEK in 2013. The average maturity of newly issued covered bonds was 4,5 
years in 2012 (Sandström, Forsman, Stenkula von Rosen, & Fager Wettergren, 2013). 
 
It is evident that Sweden has a well-developed bond market where debt is traded freely. 
Sweden thereby scores 4 / 4 points in this category. 
 
 
4.5.4 Government support for low-income users and infrastructure 
affordability 
 
In 2012, the total cost for local and regional public transport amounted to 36,5 billion 
SEK in Sweden. 17,6 billion SEK or roughly 49 % was financed through grants from the 
Scoring evaluation criteria: 
0 = The markets for finance and risk instruments are underdeveloped or non-existent, and only 
foreign sources provide project funding. 
1 = The market for local finance is slowly developing, although most finance comes from 
international sources and risk-hedging instruments are not robust. 
2 = Some finance and risk instruments exist, although financing still comes mainly from foreign and 
multilateral organizations. 
3 = The domestic market presents a large, reliable financing market, but risk instruments are still 
developing in size and complexity. 
4 = There is a deep, liquid finance market locally, as well as a reliable and large local market for 
hedging instruments. 
This indicator evaluates whether there is a liquid, deep local currency-denominated, fixed-rate, 
medium-term (five years-plus) bond market in marketable debt. In other words - is debt traded 
freely? 
Scoring evaluation criteria: 
0 = There is no securities market for fixed-rate financing of over one year. 
1 = There is a government securities market in place, but for short maturities only. 
2 = The government is fostering a medium-term market and it should be in place soon. 
3 = There is a medium-term (five years-plus) debt market, but only for public sector (government 
bond) issuers. 
4 = There is a medium-term (five years-plus) debt market for both public and private sector issuers. 
This indicator examines whether the government provide subsidies that allow low-income users better 
access to water and transport services. 
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state, county council or municipality. The distribution between these was 88 % from 
county councils, 11 % from municipalities and the remaining 1 % from the state. Since 1 
January 2012, the public transport legislation has opened up the public transport market 
for private parties. Furthermore, the act dictates that regional public transport agencies 
are responsible to uphold public transport in areas where public transport is not 
commercially viable (Trafikanalys, 2013). Finally, within the scope of the national 
Swedish transport policy, it is evident that public transport has a prioritised role 
(Regeringskansliet, 2013).  
 
While the question of government support for water is more applicable to developing 
countries, it stands clear that Sweden provides water cheaply and to a very high quality. 
The national water grid was developed by the municipalities in the 1950’s and 1960’s and 
such investments was back then subsidised by the Swedish government (Råd & Rön, 
2012). In relation to the income level in Sweden, water is cheap with an average price of 
0.025 SEK per litres (Svenskt Vatten, 2014).  
 
Sweden is often considered to be a country with rather equal wealth distribution. 
Thereby, government subsidies and affordability is not a major issue in the country. For 
these reasons, Sweden scores 4 / 4 points in this category.  
 
 
4.6 Sub-national adjustment  
 
KKV argues that there is considerable freedom as to the choice of procurement form for 
Swedish municipalities and county councils (KKV, 2014). However, as brought forth by 
SKL, governmental policy has certain influence on the actual autonomy and capacity to 
carry out PPPs (SKL, 2014). Furthermore, VTI describes municipal clients as being 
particularly vulnerable when procuring PPP projects, referring to the lack of public 
support and opportunistic behaviour from contractors (VTI, 2014).  
 
The success and consistency of the related frameworks is controversial. As brought forth 
previously, the governmental advisory and support organisations for PPP seem 
somewhat spread and immature. This is partly because KKV has not fully adopted the 
Scoring evaluation criteria: 
0 = The government does not subsidise the water or transport sector, or has done so in an extremely 
distortionary manner. 
1 = The government does not subsidies the water or transport sector, or has done so in a moderately 
distortionary manner. 
2 = The government occasionally provides subsidies for improved access to water or transport for the 
poor, but these are infrequent or applied only in certain cases. 
3 = The government usually provides satisfactory subsidies for low-income users, but this can vary by 
sector and project. 
4 = Subsidies are common, reliable and effectively target low-income users. 
This indicator evaluates whether infrastructure PPPs can be carried out at a regional, state or 
municipal level, and the relative success and consistency of these frameworks.  
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new support task and partly because several entities are responsible for the evaluation of 
procurement form, monitoring and follow-up in a given project. The success of the 
frameworks is furthermore hard to evaluate considering the few examples of realised 
PPP projects on local level.  
 
Considering the skewed local autonomy, lack of public support and the insufficient 
frameworks, Sweden scores 2 / 4 points in this category.  
 
 
4.7 Additional findings 
While the framework provides an overall view of the PPP readiness in Sweden, it fails to 
capture nuances and underlying explanations. Furthermore, this section will provide 
additional findings relevant to the purpose that did not fit within the scope of the 
framework. 
 
Based on the political ambiguity it stands clear that consensus is rather divergent in 
Sweden regarding PPP at the moment. Differences in opinion concerning the 
effectiveness of PPP is one side of the story but it was also found that opinions are 
multifaceted regarding the driving forces of PPP. For example, one main point that was 
emphasised was the belief that PPP increases innovation. The supporting argument was 
that the private side is more innovative, thus increasing project innovativity given that 
the private side was given enough freedom to do so. Examples given were 
predominantly in other countries such as Norway but experiences in current domestic 
projects such as NKS was also highlighted. The innovation argument was expressed by 
governmental organisations such as SKL, VTI and KKV but also by stakeholders on the 
private side such as Skanska and PwC. FD however expressed an ambivalent stance, 
suggesting that there might be increased innovation but that the same result can be 
reached through performance requirement contracts without PPP. 
 
Several respondents also described the malpractice of using PPP as a financial solution. 
Using PPP as a financial tool was described as a driving force in more impoverished 
countries to work around budgetary rules such as the Maastricht treaty and had 
consequently put those projects and states in economic distress. Portugal was one such 
example that was brought up by PwC. 
Scoring evaluation criteria: 
0 = The legal framework does not allow regional or municipal entities to concession public works, or 
in practice the requirements are extremely cumbersome. 
1 = The legal framework allows regional and municipal entities to concession public works, but 
technical capacity or political will is lacking. 
2 = A few successful examples of regional or municipal concessions exist, but capacity and projects at 
this level across the country are generally weak. 
3 = A significant concessions programme has been developed at a municipal or regional level, with 
good implementation capacity and institutional design. 
4 = An important and diverse (in terms of sectors and locations) concession programme has been 
developed at the municipal or regional level, and it benefits from a homogeneous framework, good 
local implementation capacity and institutional design. 
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A third driving force that was expressed was the ability to transfer risks, a core idea to 
PPP. For example, it was described that the municipalities or county councils have the 
ability to transfer unwanted risk to private parties to instead focus on the core mission 
(KKV, 2014). PwC further argued that transferring risk to increase value should be the 
only driving force to use PPP (PwC, 2014). Related to the transfer of risk and value, one 
important aspect that was discussed was whether PPP actually reduced build time. FD 
conservatively stated that PPPs might potentially reduce build time; while other 
respondents argued that build time is reduced as a result of the contractor carrying the 
delay risk (FD, 2014). 
 
When asked why the stakeholder believed that PPP is seldom used in Sweden, the 
explanations differed. A general point of view is that Sweden has been conservative 
regarding alternative procurement forms historically. It was however mentioned that 
Infrastrukturdepartementet has just recently released a report initiating a strategic move 
from traditional procurement towards performance requirement contracts (Skanska, 
2014). FD elaborates on this further by stating that their view on fiscal policy is intended 
to be stringent - they want projects to be financed with what public funding is available 
at the moment (FD, 2014). PPP seems to be a political controversy in Sweden and the 
opinion spans across ideology, even within the political parties (SHB, 2014). 
 
The negative attitude primarily stems from one argument: PPP means more expensive 
private financing than a project traditionally procured by a public entity (Borg, 2014; FD, 
2014). There are disparate opinions whether this is the only basis for determining PPP 
VFM, which have to be considered. VTI means that while a loan given to a public entity 
is in fact cheaper, it is not a holistic view on the costs associated with the two different 
procurement forms. The alternative cost for the government is not the interest rate, it is 
the cost of delays and cost overruns (VTI, 2014). Moreover, the consequence of such 
delays or cost overruns are often neglected in traditional procurement - in worst case the 
public client simply dispenses more cash into the project. In PPP, such occurrences 
would instead affect the SPV considerably. VTI means that these arguments are often 
overlooked when debating the cost of PPP compared to traditional procurement (VTI, 
2014). Moreover, the interest rate argument has more substance now compared to 
before the financial crisis. Before the financial crisis, the public to private interest rate 
spread was down to 75-100 basis points while it is now closer to 200-400 basis points 
(PwC, 2014).  
 
Another argument associated to the cost of PPP is that it is not entirely comparable to 
traditional procurement. What is easily forgotten is that a higher price tag comes with 
benefits for the public party such as not having to carry the risk and having a fixed cost 
(SLL, 2014; SHB, 2014; Coor, 2014; SHP, 2014). It is thereby incorrect to say that the 
public entity would always be cheaper off procuring a project themselves as such a cost 
often fail to properly calculate all the risks (PwC, 2014).  
 
Besides the debate of the cost of private capital, another issue is the political sensitivity 
of private capital in infrastructure. In particular, the on-going debate is whether or not to 
allow government service providers in healthcare to be owned by private equity firms for 
example. Although being a tangible difference from the PPP debate, SHP claims that the 
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debate has spilled over into arguments regarding PPP, especially considering NKS being 
a PPP project (SHP, 2014).  
 
Furthermore, another argument commonly experienced and expressed by the 
stakeholders is the question of the complexity, which PPP projects involve. Several 
respondents mentioned that the complexity of constructing the proper contracts needed 
might be an obstacle for PPP in Sweden (NIB, 2014; SLL, 2014; SHP, 2014). The 
supporting argument was that the long contractual period and large volume accounts for 
this complexity. It is however possible that the government could upbring the 
competence needed for such contracts, but that is thought to be harder on a municipal 
level (FD, 2014). Regardless, PwC argues that traditional procurement should be as 
complex if the procuring party really wants to reach the same level of quality and 
functionality. The difference is that within the scope of PPP, the procuring party has to 
provide more resources to calculate what is needed (PwC, 2014). Consequently, NIB 
believes that the client is required to be able to handle the complexity in such 
calculations, so that it can pressure the bidding parties to better prices (NIB, 2014). 
Complexity may also sprout less competition in the bidding process as the preparation of 
contracts may be too costly (KKV, 2014). 
 
The final expressed obstacle is the reduced budgetary resources for future governments 
that PPP projects might lead to. Finansminister Anders Borg is one such proclaimer, an 
opinion shared and confirmed by FD. Once again, the example of Portugal is brought up 
as an example where insufficient cost calculations and forecasts created strained public 
finances (SHP, 2014). Furthermore, there is a component of psychology in decision-
making, where SLL suggests that it is more of a burden for the decision maker to lock 
the project over the full life cycle (SLL, 2014). However, there are nuances in this 
question as well. PwC argues that it is more of a question of accounting principles, since 
county councils would have financed a project over a long time anyway. At the same 
time, the client costs are more fixed and controllable from the get-go, something that 
Finanslandstingsråd Torbjörn Rosdahl of SLL has stated as positive (Skanska, 2014). 
 
For the future of PPP in Sweden, SLL believes that many decision makers await the 
outcome of NKS. The inexperience from other projects thus acts as a roadblock until 
effects from NKS can be seen. There is however already important know-how to be 
absorbed from the projects initial phases. One such practice is the use of 50/50 
financing in the building phase of the project. SLL argues that the 50/50 solution 
reduced financial costs and SHP emphasises that it did not interfere with the incentives 
of the contract (SHP, 2014; SLL, 2014). As to other solutions of reducing financial cost 
of PPP projects, VTI reports on an initiative in Norway where the government guarantee 
the loans thereby reducing interest rates (VTI, 2014). In regards to political sensitivity, 
several respondents opened up for the use of pension capital. While several pension 
funds already allocate some of their investments towards infrastructure projects directly 
or indirectly through infrastructure mutual funds, the current legislation and regulatory 
framework inhibits full freedom to invest in PPP projects. For the sake of the Swedish 
national pension funds, the Swedish national pension funds regulation prohibits more 
than 5% allocation towards over-the-counter investments such as infrastructure or 
infrastructure funds (Skandia, 2014; (AP3, 2014b). For privately owned insurance 
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investors, the European Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC) instead penalise capital 
invested in such projects or funds (Skandia, 2014) 
 
The final suggestion that respondents mentioned was that of organisational entities to 
support knowledge sharing and provide guidance and support for procuring PPP 
projects. VTI had already advised FD to investigate how such an organisation could be 
developed and suggested to look towards the United Kingdom where such organisations 
already exist (VTI, 2014). Skanska also reported on initiatives in Norway and Finland 
where the national transport agencies are looking to become more independent from 
politics imposed from the government in order to increase strategic decision-making 
capability and becoming more forward-looking (Skanska, 2014). 
 
4.8 Summarising and scoring Sweden  
4.8.1 Scoring 
 
Figure 11: Combined score	  
  Weights Scores 
1. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 25,0% 71,9 
2. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 20,0% 66,7 
3. OPERATIONAL MATURITY 15,0% 32,5 
4. INVESTMENT CLIMATE 15,0% 58,8 
5. FINANCIAL FACILITIES 15,0% 99,9 
6. SUB-NATIONAL ADJUSTMENT 10,0% 50,0 
OVERALL SCORE 
 
65,0 
	  
Each category score is made up by the following indicators and weights. 
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  Weights Scores 
 
Scoresn  
1. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK     71,9 
1.1 Consistency and quality of PPP regulations 37,5% 3 28,1 
1.2 Effective PPP selection and decision-making 25,0% 2 12,5 
1.3 Fairness/openness of bids, contract changes 12,5% 4 12,5 
1.4 Dispute resolution mechanisms 25,0% 3 18,8 
2. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK     66,7 
2.1 Quality of institutional design 66,7% 2 33,4 
2.2 PPP contract, hold-up and expropriation risk 33,3% 4 33,3 
3. OPERATIONAL MATURITY     32,5 
3.1 Public capacity to plan and oversee PPPs 25,0% 1 6,3 
3.2 Methods and criteria for awarding projects  12,5% 3 9,4 
3.3 Regulators' risk allocation record 12,5% 3 9,4 
3.4 Experience in electricity, transport and water 
concessions 25,0% 5a 1,3 
3.5 Quality of electricity, transport and water concessions 25,0% 1 6,3 
4. INVESTMENT CLIMATE     58,8 
4.1 Political distortion 25,0% 89a 22,3 
4.2 Business environment 25,0% 80a 20,0 
4.3 Political will 50,0% 1 16,5 
5. FINANCIAL FACILITIES     99,9 
5.1 Government payment risk 22,2% 4 22,2 
5.2 Capital market: private infrastructure finance 44,4% 4 44,4 
5.3 Marketable debt 22,2% 4 22,2 
5.4 Government support and affordability for low 
income users 11,1% 4 11,1 
6. SUB-NATIONAL ADJUSTMENT     50,0 
6.1 Sub-national adjustment factor (national adjustment 
for states) 100,0% 2 50,0 
n = normalised score, a = absolute score 
    
Qualitative data is hard to quantify and score. With the available empiric data and the 
weights supplied, the reader is encouraged to form their own opinion in regards to the 
score. 
4.8.2 Enabling factors 
The enabling factors of PPP that have been observed are all fairly sluggish factors. 
Sluggish, in the sense that measures to improve said factors require excessive time 
and/or resources. The strongest observed category is the financial facilities, where Sweden 
seems to have everything in place to fund infrastructure by PPP. To improve the 
government payment risk by improving state or county council credit rating for example, 
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can be considered a very tedious and hard task to perform. Furthermore, stable macro-
economic environment (Dailami & Klein, 1998; Qiao et al., 2001), sound economic policy 
(European Investment Bank, 2000) and availability of financial markets (Akintoye et al., 
2001; C McCarthy & LK Tiong, 1991; Jefferies et al., 2002; Qiao et al., 2001) are 
identified as critical success factors for PPP projects, further contributing to the 
importance of Sweden’s quality in these areas. As such, the fact that Sweden scores high 
in these particular categories can be seen as a very positive foundation.  
 
Furthermore, strengths are particularly found in indicators based on overall legal, 
commercial, competitive and social aspects rather than PPP specific factors. Competitive 
procurement process (Gentry & Fernandez, 1997; Jefferies et al., 2002; Kopp, 1997), 
transparency in the procurement process (Gentry & Fernandez, 1997; Jefferies et al., 2002; 
Kopp, 1997) and a favourable legal framework (Bennett, 1998; Boyfield, 1992; Jones et al., 
1996; Stein, 1995) are identified as critical success factors. This further suggests that the 
groundwork of PPP in Sweden is considered strong, while inadequacy is primarily found 
in factors requiring experience or competence in PPP specifically.  
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5 Constraints of realising Public-Private Partnerships 
Based on the categories in which Sweden scored poorly, the presented causes behind these scores and 
research relevant for the categories at hand, three major constraints of success are identified. These consist 
of several sub-areas, each explained in depth. Finally, measures for improving each area are presented. 
 
Considering the weight of the indicators and the resulting total score, it can be concluded 
that Sweden have several factors that need to be improved in order to be seen as fully 
ready for PPP projects. The weaknesses from the index are mainly found in categories 
and indicators heavily weighted, suggesting that improvements in these factors will 
considerably add to the readiness of Sweden. Political will is one such indicator that 
heavily counterbalances the readiness, and improvement in the same could happen in 
short time. Related weak indicators are public capacity to plan and oversee projects, quality of 
institutional design and tools for effective decision-making, suggesting synergies in an eventual 
countermeasure.  
 
5.1 Insufficient evaluation 
5.1.1 Defining insufficient evaluation 
The first identified constraint of success is evaluation, which addresses the poorly scored 
indicator effective PPP selection and decision-making. 
 
As clarified in the assessment, Sweden lacks a systematic procedure for evaluating 
procurement forms in general and PPP in particular. Several respondents describe that 
procurement form evaluations occur either too rarely or by a non-systematic and non-
formalised approach. Furthermore, Swedish decision makers appear to insufficiently 
value the impact of cost overruns and delays when calculating the cost of a traditionally 
procured project. This type of evaluation is identified in the critical success factors 
thorough and realistic assessment of the costs and benefits (Brodie, 1995; Hambros et al., 1999; 
Qiao et al., 2001) as well as appropriate risk allocation and risk sharing (Grant, 1996; Qiao et 
al., 2001). L. Andersson and Sirén (2009) also highlight the importance of the assessment, 
calculation and allocation of risk. Finally, Grimsey and Lewis (2005) argue that fair, realistic 
and comprehensive evaluation of the public alternative to a PPP alternative is essential in 
deciding the highest VFM.  
 
Looking at Sweden’s insufficient evaluation process and how this process is highlighted 
among researchers and practitioners, insufficient evaluation is arguably a constraint of 
success in Swedish PPP procurement. 
  
5.1.2 Improving evaluation processes 
When it comes to measures to reduce this constraint, the establishment of a systematic 
PSC is a convenient and proven measure available. Despite its drawbacks presented in 
section 3.2.5, it is considered to be a well-tried and effective decision-making tool in PPP 
procurement when used properly. When formalising such a tool, special attention should 
preferably be given to countries with long experiences and thorough lessons learned. 
One such country is the United Kingdom, a pioneer in the field of PPPs. Since proper 
execution of the PSC is equally important to the very existence of the same, Sweden 
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needs to address several underlying capacities in addition to formalising the PSC tool. 
These include economic appraisal techniques with an emphasis on the valuation and 
consideration of transferable risk when calculating the public alternative - an area that 
Sweden substantially could develop. 
 
5.2 Inadequate organisational support and knowledge 
5.2.1 Defining organisational support and knowledge 
The second identified constraint for success is insufficient organisational support and 
knowledge, which addresses the poorly scored indicators quality of institutional design, 
public capacity to plan and oversee PPPs and sub-national adjustment. 
 
When looking at the domestic organisational support for public procurement and PPP, 
Sweden lacks several capabilities and perhaps importantly, coordination of the same. 
Considering that KKV has not yet adopted the procurement support role to full extent 
and that accountability is spread among public agencies for PPP planning, monitoring 
and follow-up, it is evident that Sweden lacks the proper organisational support for PPP 
projects. Furthermore, the lack of domestic PPP specific agencies as well as membership 
in international organisations aiming to capture and share PPP knowledge further 
contributes to this constraint. At local level, respondents describe substantial challenges 
among municipal clients in the procurement process, mainly stemming from a lack of 
knowledge and available support. This is highlighted by Cruz and Marques (2013), 
suggesting that local clients are particularly vulnerable to high transaction costs and 
opportunism when lacking competence and support. Finally, the somewhat skewed local 
autonomy caused by government policy intervention in the local operation is another 
factor contributing to this constraint. These lacking capabilities all result in incapacity 
among public entities of becoming competent clients. These capabilities are highlighted 
in the critical success factors good governance (Badshah, 1998; Frilet, 1997; Qiao et al., 
2001), particularly emphasising accountability and clear governance, and a well organised 
and committed public agency (Boyfield, 1992; Jones et al., 1996; Stein, 1995).  
 
The phenomenon of insufficient coordination has also been observed at state agency 
level, more specifically at Trafikverket. A described shortcoming is the agency’s 
incapacity to incorporate the life cycle perspective and specify functional requirements, 
where clear separation of the construction and maintenance phases of a project are 
identified as the main driver. As suggested by Leahy (2005), integration between the 
construction and contract departments is important for achieving long-term efficiency 
gains. The root cause of this separation seems to be the annual public budget allocation 
structure, resulting in a short-term cost assessment and the neglecting of possible cost 
savings over the life cycle. This phenomenon of excessive governmental control is raised 
by International Transport Forum & OECD (2008) arguing that it limits long-term life 
cycle and strategic planning. Overall, these insufficient capabilities together result in an 
underdeveloped pipeline, highlighted by Deloitte (2012) as the single most important 
factor making a PPP market attractive. Under these terms, it is evident that procurement 
decision makers see PPP projects as highly complex.  
 
In summary, Sweden has an insufficient organisational PPP support and lacking capacity 
to capture and share PPP knowledge, resulting in an underdeveloped pipeline. 
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Considering the emphasis on the importance of a clear pipeline, PPP knowledge sharing 
and being a competent client, it can clearly be argued that inadequate organisational support 
and knowledge is a constraint for realising PPP projects in Sweden.  
 
5.2.2 Improving the lack of organisational support and knowledge 
It could be argued that Sweden would benefit from a) establishing PPP procurement 
support, b) assuring the capturing and sharing of PPP knowledge, c) defining 
organisational accountability. This could either be done by clarifying and extending 
KKV’s current task to include and specialise in PPP support and knowledge or by 
establishing a new agency solely focusing on PPP support and knowledge. The latter has 
been done in the United Kingdom in the shape of 4ps, an institution supporting local 
governments (4ps, 2014). By establishing this type of domestic PPP knowledge 
infrastructure, Sweden’s PPP pipeline would be substantially improved. Furthermore, a 
membership in international organisations, such as C.R.E.A.M. (European PPP Alliance) 
or EPEC (European PPP Expertise Centre), would further contribute to capturing and 
sharing knowledge from international experiences. The overall output of these measures 
combined is Swedish public entities becoming more competent clients and facilitation of 
the PPP process, which today is experienced as highly complex.  
 
In regards to Trafikverket, the question of increased cooperation between construction 
and maintenance and, in a longer perspective, the annual public budget allocation, needs 
to be addressed. A closer internal collaboration between the departments would improve 
the ability to incorporate the life cycle perspective. Since the separation stems from the 
allocation of the public budget, it is an extended issue to address. As brought forth, 
International Transportation Forum & OECD (2008) discuss the matter of excessive 
governmental control in public procurement. Based on the idea of benefits arising from 
clearer specialisation, it could be argued that enhanced autonomy as to budget planning 
in Trafikverket would enhance the possibilities of taking a life cycle perspective into 
account. As such autonomy is somewhat dependent on the annual public budget 
allocation, a more flexible one that allows life cycle perspective and long-term planning is 
arguably favourable. However, as later discussed in the constraint political resistance, the 
principle of flexible budget potentially compromises Finansdepartementet’s principle of 
a sound and restrictive public budget.  
 
5.3 Political resistance 
5.3.1 Analysing political will 
In regards to the assessment of Sweden’s PPP readiness, the perhaps most significant 
and low-scoring indicator is that of political will. As such, it leaves open a large room for 
improvement, if Sweden is to become a country with PPP readily available in its 
infrastructure investment toolbox. Political support is also described as a critical success 
factor either enabling or disabling PPP altogether (Qiao et al., 2001; Zhang et al., 1998). 
Intuitively, regardless of how well a country scores in other indicators, PPP will not 
happen unless decision makers have the interest to do so. 
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Thereby, political resistance is considered to be a major constraint in its current form. 
Following the assessment of Sweden, three main reasons making up the political 
resistance has been identified. These are: 
 
• the argument “PPP is too expensive”. 
• the argument “PPP reduces budgetary resources for future governments”. 
• the argument “private capital in public interest is undesirable”. 
 
5.3.1.1 “PPP is  too  expens iv e”  
Picking through the parts making up the “too expensive” argument, the main points 
discussed is the interest rate spread and the overall cost of PPP projects in comparison 
to traditional procurement. Finansminister Anders Borg and consequently 
Finansdepartementet is spearheading the argument concerning the interest rate spread. 
While it is impossible to argue against such a statement, that 2 % is less than 4 %, it does 
not fully encompass the holistic view that determining VFM requires. Pivoting the 
debate solely around such a statement is counterproductive and will dismiss discussions 
of the real benefits or issues with PPP. 
 
Financial spread 
Nonetheless, reducing the interest rate spread is definitely an important aspect to 
examine. What should not be forgotten is that the interest rate spread has historically 
been lower than it is today, something that was also mentioned by PwC (2014) and 
displayed in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12: Interest rate spread, as adopted by Riksbanken (2013) 
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Furthermore, the interest rate quoted for private lenders is a function of the market risk 
premium demanded for PPP projects. From the assessment of Sweden and considering 
the few projects conducted, it can be concluded that the market for PPP is still under 
development. With a more consistent and proven track record of successful PPP 
projects, it could be argued that the interest rates would be reduced, and international 
experiences show that so is the case (VTI, 2014). 
 
Whether or not loans given by banks is the most efficient source of capital, the question 
of alternative financing methods arises. Infrastructure should be an appealing investment 
as it is an asset that (AP3, 2014a): 
 
• has low correlation with other asset classes 
• is relatively secured against inflation 
• provides stable cash flows (since the future payments are fixed and paid for by a 
highly credit-rated party in the form of the state, county council or municipality) 
• diversifies the portfolio 
 
The characteristics of institutional capital should thereby be of interest. First of, the long-
term perspective of institutional capital should have a closer fit with the long-term 
perspective of PPP projects, thereby diminishing the liquidity premium of tied up capital 
that other lenders or investors might demand. Furthermore, the long-term perspective 
and financial stability of pension funds should reduce the likelihood of forced exits in 
PPP projects, something closely related to the critical success factor strong private 
consortiums (Birnie, 1999; Jefferies et al., 2002; Tiong, 1996). 
 
Another aspect is the trust and credibility of pension funds in general and national 
pension funds in particular. Since these act on behalf of large portions of Sweden’s 
citizens, the mission is to provide long-term return and stability to the pension system. 
With an aligned and mutual interest of providing welfare and economic growth, a 
prerequisite for a sustainable pension system, infrastructure should serve as an attractive 
asset class to invest in. A pension fund is also arguably less politically sensitive than a 
private investor primarily seeking return for its shareholders. 
The obstacles facing institutional capital to invest in infrastructure is however of 
regulatory nature. More specifically, Swedish national pension fund legislation restricts 
pension funds to invest more than 5 % in over-the-counter assets. The insurance 
companies are also facing obstacles through the European Solvency II directive 
(2009/138/EC), as described by Skandia (2014). 
 
Reducing the financial spread 
With the increasing interest from institutional investors to invest in infrastructure, the 
obstacles to invest in the same needs to be overcome. One such action reported in 
section 3.2.3 is the European 2020 Project Bond Initiative. By the facilitation of project 
bonds as an investable asset, an investment opportunity opens up for the Swedish 
national pension funds as well as insurance companies. 
While the European 2020 Project Bond Initiative primarily targets lesser rated countries 
where capital is scarce or costly, there is inspiration to be drawn for a Swedish similarity. 
In its current mission, the European Investment Bank support infrastructure projects by 
A Road to Success Under Construction? 
 
67 
providing a credit enhancing subordinated loan. However, the condition for this 
subordinated loan is that it enhances the senior debt project bonds to a credit rating of 
AA at the most. As a point of reference, SLL is already rated AA+ (Standard & Poor's, 
2012). In this respect, the Swedish state, county councils and municipalities are already 
strongly rated and as such in minor need and non-eligible for credit enhancement by the 
European Investment Bank. However, in order to increase the credit rating to AAA, 
thereby reducing interest rate of the issued project bonds further, it would be interesting 
to examine the possibility of a similar guarantee from the Nordic Investment Bank or 
perhaps even Riksgälden. The critical success factor, government involvement through 
guarantees (Kanter, 1999; Qiao et al., 2001; Stonehouse et al., 1996; Zhang et al., 1998), is 
thereby something that could benefit Sweden further. A similar scheme has already been 
used in the case of NKS, where the construction cost was financed to 50 % by 
compensation being paid ahead from the public side. 
 
In sum, the project bond alternative will have to be evaluated further in a Swedish 
context. However, in theory it should open up the possibility of investments from 
institutional investors with a comparable time horizon to that of PPP projects. 
Furthermore, the political sensitivity of pension capital is also an aspect to consider. 
With the use of guarantees from the government, the credit rating for project bonds 
should in turn increase thereby reducing the cost of debt. These measures may very well 
require a pilot phase, but should reduce the financial spread in theory. 
 
Excessive cost of PPP projects 
Besides the financial spread, another reason mentioned concerning the cost of PPP 
projects is that it is overall more expensive. The problem is that comparisons to 
traditional procurement are often skewed, similar to comparing apples and oranges. 
Something to consider is the socio-economic effects of performance requirement 
contracts as opposed to construction contracts. Imagine a highway traditionally procured 
where the client specifies that it wants a two-lane highway for the lowest possible cost. 
Now imagine the same highway procured with functional specifications, where the 
contractor receives payment in relation to the passability, the infrequency of traffic jams, 
the amount of accidents etcetera. Intuitively, the contractor will in the second alternative 
be forced to become innovative and efficient, thinking of the full life cycle. Such effects 
are often foreseen when comparing the two procurement forms. 
 
Another concern is the fact that construction costs are often compared isolatedly to 
support the argument of PPP being too expensive. As mentioned by VTI, the alternative 
cost to be added to the comparison, and that is frequently left out, is the cost of delays 
and budget overruns. The risk of these costs is a risk borne by the government and in 
turn by all the taxpayers, which conflicts with the theory of risk allocation where each 
risk should be borne by the party best able to carry it (Cooper et al., 2005; Medda, 2007). 
In PPP, the contractor instead carries this risk, hence the premium demanded. However, 
in order to determine if the risk is in fact carried by the party best able to manage it, a 
thorough assessment and comparison between the two procurement forms needs to be 
performed more systematically. 
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Overcoming the excessive cost argument 
With the lack of systematic procedures for assessing procurement forms, it is evident 
that Swedish organisations are in need of guidance. A tool similar to the PSC, along with 
competent risk calculation support, can in a more systematised way determine if PPP is 
in fact a better alternative than traditional procurement for a given project. The 
importance of a holistic perspective when comparing two bids is once again stressed. 
Furthermore, sufficient competition is needed in order to determine who is best abled to 
carry risk among the private bidders. In order to achieve this, the public client needs to 
attract foreign PPP players as well. Such a feat will not be possible unless the public side 
performs thorough research of future potential PPP projects and makes an official 
statement of its intents to procure the same as PPP. An action similar to that of the 
Norwegian Parliament, where officials announced a transportation plan together with the 
decision to procure three highways as PPP pilot projects, may be needed in Sweden to 
attract international attention. 
 
5.3.1 .2  “PPP reduces  the  fu ture  budge tary  r e sourc e s” 
The second reason observed making up the political resistance constraint is the argument 
that PPP locks up capital in inflexible arrangements thereby reducing budgetary 
resources for future decision makers. In short, this argument is more often heard from 
politicians themselves, as was recorded from Anders Borg for example. The concern is 
definitely legitimate, as the negative outcome of irresponsible realisation of PPP projects 
has caused massive economic distress in countries such as Portugal in the past. However, 
it should be noted that the question is more of an accounting principle, as any 
infrastructure project will bring with it future costs. Even though one could argue that 
the full life cycle cost might as well then be accounted for and earmarked in the same 
year it was decided, the politicians would not trust future politicians to not use any of the 
previously earmarked capital (FD, 2014). 
 
Counteracting the reduced budget argument 
The debate revolving around this argument has to be nuanced. Infrastructure is, in its 
nature, static after it has been constructed and will require refurbishments in the future 
regardless of procurement form. The argument is furthermore directed towards PPP in 
general while the perceived problem already exists within governmental functions. As an 
example, consider the rented facilities of a police headquarter. Such a facility is 
customised to incorporate all needed functions for police activity, like a custody for 
example. Since the facility is less desirable for other functions than police activity, the 
private owner has to calculate the rent based on a residual value close to zero at contract 
maturity. Thereby, the contracts often span over long term, and the question of 
inflexibility is present in this scenario as well. 
 
A restrictive and conservative budget that force prioritisation of capital for the decision 
maker is indeed a sound principle to live by. However, it can be questioned whether it 
actually encourages life cycle and holistic perspective of investments. How this can be 
solved technically or in practice is an interesting discussion, but it is out of the scope of 
this thesis. 
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5.3.1 .3  “Priva te  cap i ta l  in  pub l i c  in t e r e s t  i s  undes i rab le” 
The third reason for political resistance is the fact that private capital in public interests is 
sensitive. Social support is denoted by Frilet (1997) as a critical success factor of PPP, and 
it is thereby something that needs to be received from the public in order to improve 
political will. Regardless of knowledge or understanding of PPP, the opinion may be 
formed from an ideological perspective. As noted from the respondents, the debate is 
often mixed up with the debate regarding private equity owning health care providers 
(SHP, 2014). Furthermore, there seems to be a general suspicion that private parties will 
reap all the profits, lower the quality and then exit the project letting the public party 
clean up the mess. 
 
Tackling the political sensitivity 
Measures regarding the financial side of the SPV have already been suggested in the 
project bond discussion. In general terms, the PPP contractors need to instil a sense of 
trust for PPP among the public. This can be achieved by increasing the critical success 
factor transparency of the procurement process (Gentry & Fernandez, 1997; Jefferies et al., 2002; 
Kopp, 1997). For example, the use of more formal assessment methods such as a PSC 
and public transparency surrounding the same will help the decision maker point to the 
facts when being scrutinised. Furthermore, the importance of the critical success factor 
competition in the procurement process (Gentry & Fernandez, 1997; Jefferies et al., 2002; Kopp, 
1997) cannot be stressed enough. Even though sufficient competition was deemed to 
exist in the NKS project, the amount of final bids will have to increase in future projects 
to regain public trust. 
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6 Conclusion 
This chapter presents the major findings of the thesis, their practical implications and how these were 
concluded.  
 
This thesis has identified three major constraints of realising PPP projects in Sweden; 
insufficient evaluation, inadequate organisational support and knowledge and political resistance. By 
assessing Sweden’s PPP readiness in the Infrascope index, low-scoring PPP readiness 
areas were identified. To seek further explanation for the low scores, the low-scoring 
areas were further examined. By comparing the low-scoring areas with the related 
explanations and critical success factors for PPPs, three major areas of constraints were 
identified. These are:  
 
• Insufficient evaluation, which refers to the lacking capacity of evaluating public and 
private alternatives.  
• Inadequate organisational support and knowledge, which refers to the insufficient 
coordination of support and capturing and sharing of PPP knowledge.  
• Political resistance, which refers to the lack of political will to conduct PPP projects 
and the underlying arguments.  
 
Furthermore, measures have been suggested for each constraint. Measures involve the 
establishment of a formalised and systematic evaluation tool for insufficient evaluation, a 
domestic and international PPP knowledge infrastructure for inadequate organisational 
support and knowledge. For political resistance, the measures involve nuancing the debate, an 
investigation of alternative financing forms and the establishment of a clear and a 
transparent decision-making tool. 
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7 Discussion and Critical Review 
This chapter discusses the shortcomings of the findings and the method. Finally, further research is 
suggested.  
 
The research conducted in this thesis is highly relevant in the sense that public funds are 
likely to be insufficient for funding desired infrastructure investments in the future. 
Every procurement form involves different benefits and drawbacks and PPP is merely 
one tool in the toolbox. Different procurement forms are essentially more or less 
suitable for different types of projects. However, with the privilege of choosing among a 
wide range of tools, Sweden is arguably more prepared for the future of infrastructure 
investments. While the research topic of PPPs is a relatively new one, it has been given 
considerable attention among researchers and practitioners. As research continues to 
develop and mature, Sweden and other countries will have a more solid basis for 
assessing the feasibility and prerequisites for PPPs and potentially use the procurement 
form to optimal extent under optimal conditions.  
 
In regards to the applicability of the findings in other contexts, no such generalisability is 
claimed. However, the research area of PPP concerning the emergence and utilisation in 
countries has mainly been focused on the driving forces of PPP. Less research has 
provided findings or explanations that focuses on the roadblocks of PPP in countries. 
This thesis was conducted to provide better understanding in what could constrain 
countries from using PPPs in public procurement. In order to do so, it was deemed 
more interesting to examine a country that had favourable economic conditions but still 
had a relatively low usage of PPPs compared to countries under similar economic 
conditions. The reasoning behind this was that several researchers and practitioners have 
argued that the driving force of PPP should not be of financial characteristic but rather 
to improve efficiency and increase innovation. As such, the research object would have 
to be a country with relatively low utilisation of PPP but with favourable economic 
conditions. Sweden was in this sense thereby considered the most appropriate country to 
study, as it has a relatively lower usage of PPP than its neighbouring and economically 
similar countries. Constraints identified in Sweden may thereby be of interest in order to 
fully understand what could constrain countries from utilising PPP.  
 
In a practical aspect, the constraints and related measures are valuable insights for 
Swedish decision and policy makers if PPP one day would gain more traction on the 
political agenda. With the concluded constraints and associated measures at hand, 
developing systematic evaluation procedures and organisational infrastructure will be a 
substantially easier task. However, political resistance is of special character in the sense that 
it effectively restricts necessary PPP capabilities in Sweden. Without political will and 
positive attitude towards PPPs, no PPP projects will be realised and, consequently, no 
necessary capabilities will be developed. The concept of political will is thereby a hard 
issue to address. This thesis identifies the underlying concerns that construct the Swedish 
political resistance and suggests measures for how to overcome them. Finally, the 
interconnectivity between the identified constraints should be highlighted. As opposed 
of being considered isolated, a holistic perspective should be taken when approaching 
the constraints.  
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Regarding the selection of PPP material in the thesis, the goal has been a balanced and 
nuanced representation. PPP is a highly controversial topic and there are plenty of 
proponents as well as opponents. The authors are not driven by any bias towards PPP 
and merely aim to identify what constrains Sweden from realising successful PPP 
projects.  
 
The method and the used evaluation tools, the Infrascope index and a selection of 
critical success factors, can furthermore be questioned. A different selection of 
theoretical foundation would perhaps result in different findings. Another questionable 
area is the trustworthiness and expertise of the respondents, whose answers constitute a 
large part of the collected empirical data. A different selection and different questions 
would likely affect the findings of the study to some extent.  
 
The first basis for evaluating Sweden, the Infrascope index, is a highly acknowledged 
tool across the globe. The chosen methodology for assessing Sweden is based on the one 
used by Economist Intelligence Unit, further reassuring an accurate outcome of the 
framework. However, the Infrascope assessment is by nature a challenging task, further 
enhanced by the given time and resource constraints of this thesis. The Infrascope also 
has a certain degree of built-in subjectivity; to turn qualitative data into quantitative is 
always a hard task to perform completely objectively. Finally, the Infrascope Index is, in 
full version, attached to facilitate evaluation of the assessment done by the authors.  
 
The second basis, a selection of critical success factors, is a compilation of reviews of 
United Kingdom PPPs and are, on average, from year 2000. The actuality of these 
critical success factors can thereby be questioned. However, by comparing these against 
the indicators of the Infrascope assessment, a certain degree of actuality is reassured.  
 
For further research related to the findings of this thesis, two areas are suggested. The 
first is how project bonds could be realised as an alternative form of debt financing for 
Swedish PPPs. The discussion of such alternative financing forms is currently emerging 
while this thesis is being written. There is reason to believe that project bonds might 
benefit institutional investors in terms of long-term and stable return and a lower 
financing cost for the public client. The second area is further investigation of hands-on 
implementation of the conceptual measures suggested in this report. If and when PPP 
appears on the Swedish political agenda, a thorough investigation of how the suggested 
measures could look like in reality would appear highly relevant.  
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Appendix A 
 
Generic Questions 
 
Introduction 
1. Briefly, what is your organisation’s main task regarding:  
 
a) Public procurement? 
 
b) Public-Private Partnerships? 
 
2. Briefly, what is your background and experience regarding: 
 
a) Public procurement? 
 
b) Public-Private Partnerships? 
 
Main questions 
 
1. What is your and your organisations attitude towards Public-Private Partnerships and 
why?  
 
2. What do you think are the main drivers (if you consider that there are any) to 
implement projects with Public-Private Partnerships-solutions in Sweden and why? 
 
 3. Have you ever been involved in a project, in which Public-Private Partnerships was 
considered as procurement form?  
 
a) If yes, what kind of project? 
 
b) Why did or did not did the project proceed under Public-Private Partnership 
arrangements? 
 
c) How did you think the bidding process worked? Why? What were the 
differences between traditional procurement and Public-Private 
Partnerships? 
 
4. What does the evaluation process for selection of procurement form look like in 
Sweden?  
 
5. How ready is Sweden for Public-Private Partnerships? Why?  
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6. What do you think are the main reasons to why Public-Private Partnerships are used 
so infrequently in Sweden?  
 
a) What do you think a possible solution could look like?  
 
7. How suitable are Public-Private Partnerships in Sweden, in regards to; 
 
a) Consistency and quality in the legal and regulatory framework?  
 
b) Tools for evaluating procurement form? 
 
c) The competitive perspective? 
 
d) Support from public authorities? 
 
e) Capabilities in regards to planning and monitoring of projects? 
 
Stakeholder customised questions 
 
Trafikverket 
#. What is your attitude towards Public-Private Partnerships in transport infrastructure 
projects and why?  
 
#. What does the evaluation process for selection of procurement form look like in 
transport infrastructure projects?  
 
#. How politically controlled is Trafikverket and how does it affect the decision-making? 
 
Swedish Hospital Partners 
 
#. While there were many interested potential bidders early in the bidding process, it 
ended up with only one bid. What is your view on this?  
 
#. How do you think the chosen procurement form has effected; 
 
a) the tendering process? 
 
b) the construction process? 
 
Skandia, Svenska Handelsbanken and Nordic Investment Bank  
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#. Do you currently have any exposure, direct or indirect, in Public-Private Partnerships? 
 
#. What is your experience of Public-Private Partnerships; 
 
a) in Sweden? 
 
b) globally? 
 
#. What is your attitude towards investments in Public-Private Partnerships? 
  
#. How feasible is institutional capital in Public-Private Partnerships?  
 
#. Are you familiar with ”EU/EIB 2020 Project Bond Initiative”? 
 
#. Would you, in the future, be interested in investing in project bonds from Public-
Private Partnerships; 
 
a) in Sweden? 
 
b) globally? 
  
#. What is your view on the risks related to investments in Public-Private Partnerships or 
funds that invest in those?  
 
#. Does the risk differ from other building or infrastructure funds?  
 
#. What is your involvement in Nya Karolinska Solna?  
 
#. What does the loan and mortgage structure look like? 
 
Finansdepartementet 
 
#. What does the political debate on Public-Private Partnerships in parliament sound 
like?  
 
#. Are there any block or party specific opinions in regards to Public-Private 
Partnerships? 
 
#. How much influence does Anders Borg have on the discussion regarding Public-
Private Partnerships?  
 
Coor 
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#. How does you processes differ from project where your services has been procured 
traditionally to Public-Private Partnerships?  
 
#. Have you had any opportunity to influence the construction of a project under 
Public-Private Partnership arrangements? 
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